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MARK KRAMER
DECLASSIFIED MATERIALS FROM CPSU 
CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUMS
Sources, context, highlights
IN OCTOBER 1995 the Center for Preservation of Contemporary Documentation
(TsKhSD) in Moscow, which houses the former archive of the Central Committee
(CC) of the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU), received materials from the Russian
Presidential Archive for a newly opened section known as fond 2. The new fond (an
archival term roughly translated in English as “collection”) includes different
versions of CPSU Central Committee plenum transcripts from 1918 to 1990 as well
as secret documents that were used at the plenums. Some 845 voluminous files
(dela) of declassified plenum materials from 1918 to 1941 had been available since
the early 1990s at another repository in Moscow, the former Central Party Archive
(now known as the Russian Center for Preservation and Study of Documents of
Recent History, or RTsKhIDNI); but the newly-opened fond 2 at TsKhSD is many
times larger and much more comprehensive.1 Not only does fond 2 add to the
RTsKhIDNI collection of pre-1941 materials; it also provides full documentary
coverage for the dozens of Central Committee plenums after 1941.
This article will briefly discuss the structure of fond 2, the problems that arise
when using the documents, and a few highlights from plenary sessions held in the
1950s and 1960s.
1. The materials at RTsKhIDNI for Central Committee plenums from 1918 to 1941 are stored
in opis’ 2 of fond 17. Unlike at TsKhSD, the items at RTsKhIDNI do not constitute a separate
fond.
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Structure of fond 2
Fond 2 of TsKhSD is divided among five opisi (roughly translated as “inventories”
or, in this context, “record groups”).2 Initially, only opis’ 1 of fond
 
 2 was released.
In early 1996 the Russian government’s “Commission on Declassification of
Documents Created by the CPSU” announced that the other four 
 
opisi
 
 of 
 
fond
 
 2 had
been declassified in 1995 and would be transferred to TsKhSD.
 
3
 
 Unfortunately, this
announcement turned out to be misleading. As of mid-1998, none of the other four
 
opisi
 
 had yet been transferred from the Presidential Archive. Thus, even though
 
opisi
 
 2, 3, 4, and 5 were nominally “declassified,” researchers had no access to
them. In response to complaints from visiting scholars, the director of TsKhSD
conceded that the commission’s announcement had been “premature.”
 
4
 
The four additional opisi of 
 
fond
 
 2 are due to be transferred to TsKhSD by the
latter half of 1999. However, officials at TsKhSD have no direct say in the
Presidential Archive’s actions and therefore can offer no guarantees. Once the
transfer is completed, these new 
 
opisi
 
 will provide an invaluable complement to the
existing 
 
opis’
 
 1. 
 
Opis’
 
 2 includes the protocols and stenograms from Central
Committee plenums held between 1918 and 1966, adding to the RTsKhIDNI
materials. 
 
Opis’
 
 3 includes documents from Central Committee plenums ranging
from 1966 to 1986. 
 
Opis’
 
 4 includes protocols from Central Committee plenums
held between 1966 and 1990. 
 
Opis’
 
 5 comprises documents from plenums held
 
2. In the Soviet/Russian archival lexicon, the word 
 
opis’
 
 refers both to a segment of a 
 
fond
 
 and
to the finding aid or catalog that specifies what is contained in that segment.
3. “Perechen’ dokumentov Arkhiva Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Tsentra khraneniia
sovremennoi dokumentatsii, Rossiiskogo tsentra khraneniia i izucheniia dokumentov noveishei
istorii, Tsentra khraneniia dokumentov molodezhnykh organizatsii, rassekrechennykh
Komissiei po rassekrechivaniiu dokumentov, sozdannykh KPSS, v 1994-1995,” Moscow, 1996.
A slightly abridged version of this list was published in 
 
Novaia i noveishaia istoriia
 
, 3 (May-June
1996): 249-253.
4. Conversation in Moscow between the author and Natal’ia Tomilina, director of TsKhSD,
14 July 1997. This was not the only aspect of the commission’s report that was highly
misleading. The report contains 
 
fond
 
 and 
 
opis’
 
 numbers of collections that supposedly have
been “declassified,” but it fails to mention that a large number of 
 
dela
 
 in many of these 
 
opisi
 
 are
in fact still classified. For example, the commission’s list of “declassified documents” includes
 
opis’
 
 128 of 
 
fond
 
 17 at RTsKhIDNI, which is divided into two volumes. One would expect,
based on this listing, that all documents from both volumes of the 
 
opis’
 
 would be freely
accessible, but it turns out that the entire second volume, amounting to 504 
 
dela
 
, is still
classified, and even in the first volume only some of the 702 
 
dela
 
 are actually available to
researchers. (The only way to determine which files in the first volume are really declassified is
to ask the head of the RTsKhIDNI reading room before submitting a request.) Similarly, at
TsKhSD only a small fraction of the 
 
dela
 
 in many of the purportedly“declassified” collections
are genuinely accessible. Even when files at TsKhSD are nominally “declassified,” they may
still be off limits because they supposedly contain “personal secrets” (
 
lichnye tainy
 
), which
have to be processed by an entirely separate commission. Because of the barriers posed by
classified files and files that allegedly contain personal secrets, very few files from some of the
“declassified” 
 
opisi
 
 at TsKhSD are actually given out. (This problem is compounded when, as
in the case of 
 
opisi
 
 22 and 28 of 
 
fond
 
 5 at TsKhSD, only the film reels are lent out. If one 
 
delo
 
 on
a reel is proscribed, all other 
 
dela
 
 on the reel are also off limits unless a researcher can convince
the archivists to have a staff member serve as a monitor for several hours while the researcher
uses the “permitted” 
 
dela
 
 on the reel.)
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between 1986 and 1990, the core of the period when Mikhail Gorbachev was CPSU
General Secretary.
 
Opis’
 
 1 of 
 
fond 
 
2 consists of 822 separate 
 
dela
 
, with materials arranged in the
order in which they were produced. The files include transcripts and other
documents from Central Committee plenums held between 1941 and 1966. In
principle, the plenum materials from before 1953 should be housed at RTsKhIDNI
rather than at TsKhSD. However, to maintain the integrity of the fond, the earlier
materials will be kept together with the more recent documents. All told, 
 
opis’
 
1 covers 51 plenums:
5 May 1941 (
 
delo
 
 1a) 5 September 1958 (d. 328-332)
10 October 1941 (d
 
.
 
 2) 12 November 1958 (d. 333-338)
27 January 1944 (d. 3-5) 15-19 December 1958 (d. 339-360)
11, 14, and 18 March 1946 (d. 6-8) 24-29 June 1959 (d. 361-397)
21, 22, 24, and 26 February 1947 (d. 9-20) 22-26 December 1959 (d. 398-448)
16 October 1952 (d. 21-22) 4 May 1960 (d. 449-452)
5 March 1953 (d. 23-24) 13-16 July 1960 (d. 453-485)
14 March 1953 (d. 25-26) 10-18 January 1961 (d. 486-536)
2-7 July 1953 (d. 27-45) 19 June 1961 (d. 537-543)
3-7 September 1953 (d. 46-61) 14 October 1961 (d. 544-548)
23 February-2 March 1954 (d. 62-89) 31 October 1961 (d. 549-553)
21-24 June 1954 (d. 90-109) 5-9 March 1962 (d. 554-582)
25-31 January 1955 (d. 110-138) 23 April 1962 (d. 583-587)
4-12 July 1955 (d. 139-180) 19-23 November 1962 (d. 588-623)
13 February 1956 (d. 181-184) 18-21 June 1963 (d. 624-658)
27 February 1956 (d. 185-187) 9-13 December 1963 (d. 659-696)
22 June 1956 (
 
delo
 
 188) 10-15 February 1964 (d. 697-743)
20-24 December 1956 (d. 189-208) 11 July 1964 (d. 744-747)
13-14 February 1957 (d. 209-221) 10 October 1964 (d. 748-753)
22-29 June 1957 (d. 222-259) 16 November 1964 (d. 754-764)
28-29 October 1957 (d. 260-272) 24-26 March 1965 (d. 765-786)
16-17 December 1957 (d. 273-284) 27-29 September 1965 (d. 787-805)
25-26 February 1958 (d. 285-298) 6 December 1965 (d. 806-812)
26 March 1958 (d. 299-303) 19 February 1966 (d. 813-817)
6-7 May 1958 (d. 304-318) 26 March 1966 (d. 818-822)
17-18 June 1958 (d. 319-327)
In many cases, two or more versions of the same plenum exist. The closest thing to
a verbatim transcript, known as an “uncorrected stenogram” (
 
nepravlennaia
stenogramma
 
), was compiled by a team of stenographers during the plenum.
Excerpts from this raw text were sent by the head of the CPSU CC General
Department to all those who spoke at the plenum. The speakers were permitted to
see and edit only their own remarks.
 
5
 
 The full text then underwent further editing by
one or two senior party officials. The corrected version, known as the “author’s
copy” (
 
avtorskii ekzempliar
 
), contains the full verbatim text marked up in
 
5. See, for example, the standardized form (classified “sekretno”) that was circulated along
with appropriate transcript pages to each speaker, TsKhSD, f. 2, op. 1, d. 268, l. 15.
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handwriting as well as newly drafted pages and paragraphs to be inserted into the
transcript. (Often the insertions were in handwriting, too.) The revised version was
then retyped to produce a “corrected copy” (
 
korrektorskii ekzempliar
 
), which was
given to a few senior Presidium/
 
Politbiuro
 
 members to review.
 
6
 
 Usually, one of the
officials (e.g., Mikhail Suslov) would approve the corrected copy as the final
version, but in a few cases each official would make additional changes, resulting in
an “edited copy” (
 
redaktsionnyi ekzempliar
 
). A few last-minute revisions might
then be made in the edited copy before a final “stenographic account”
(
 
stenograficheskii otchet
 
) was typeset. The whole process of editing and revision
could sometimes take several months or longer.
 
7
 
 The final stenographic account
was disseminated to all members of the CPSU Presidium/
 
Politbiuro
 
, CPSU
Secretariat, and CPSU Central Committee, to other senior employees of the central
party apparatus, to leading officials in the fourteen union-republic Communist
parties, and to the first secretaries of the CPSU’s territorial, regional, provincial,
municipal, and local committees.
The different versions of the proceedings were preserved for most, but not all, of
the 51 plenums in 
 
opis’
 
 1 of 
 
fond
 
 2. The status of each version is specified clearly
both in the 
 
opis’
 
 and on the cover of each 
 
delo
 
. The 
 
dela
 
 for a particular version are
grouped consecutively, which makes it relatively easy to distinguish them from
other versions.
In addition to the transcripts of plenum proceedings, 
 
opis’
 
 1 includes many files
of documents that were used or distributed at the plenums. These documents in
some cases were publicly available after the plenums, but in other cases they were
classified “secret” or “top secret” and issued on a highly restricted basis. For certain
plenums, a separate 
 
delo
 
 contains the resolutions and theses (or drafts) approved by
the Central Committee as well as any final comments by senior party officials.
Although 
 
opis’
 
 1, like all the other 
 
opisi
 
 of 
 
fond 
 
2, is officially described as
“declassified,” selected materials in 
 
opis’
 
 1 (and in the other four 
 
opisi
 
 of 
 
fond
 
 2)
are in fact still classified and are marked as such (
 
ne rassekrecheno
 
) in the 
 
opis’
 
.
The fact that some materials in 
 
fond
 
 2 have not yet been declassified is one of the
reasons that TsKhSD has been allowing researchers to use the original, bound
transcripts and documents, rather than microfilms of them. The listing of sequential
numbers for microfilm reels in the 
 
opisi
 
 leaves no doubt that all the 
 
dela
 
 in 
 
fond
 
 2
have been filmed, but the reels mix classified with declassified materials. Hence,
only the hard copies are being loaned out.
 
8
 
 Although the continued classification of
some materials in 
 
fond
 
 2 is vexing and unwarranted, the opportunity for scholars to
 
6. The name of the CPSU CC 
 
Politbiuro
 
 was changed to the “CPSU CC Presidium” at the XIX
Party Congress in October 1952. The name was changed back to the 
 
Politbiuro
 
 just before the
XXIII Party Congress in March 1966.
7. See, for example, “Tov. Sukovoi E. N.,” 18 March 1958, memorandum on materials to
include in the final stenographic account of the plenum held on 28-29 October 1957, TsKhSD,
f. 2, op. 1, d. 269, l. 79, as well as the attachment on ll. 80-145.
8. This is in contrast to the plenum documents in 
 
opis’
 
 2 of 
 
fond
 
 17 at RTsKhIDNI.
RTsKhIDNI gives out only the microfilms of these documents.
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use the original documents (rather than the more cumbersome and, in certain cases,
barely legible microfilms) is a welcome, if perverse, benefit of this obsessive
secretiveness.
 
The context of the plenum materials
 
Through almost the whole of the Soviet era, very little information about CPSU
Central Committee plenums was released to the public. During the long reign of
Iosif Stalin (1929-1953), virtually nothing about Central Committee plenums was
disclosed. That pattern continued for several years after Stalin’s death.
Transcripts of key plenums during Nikita Khrushchev’s consolidation of power
(e.g., the sessions in July 1953, January 1955, July 1955, February 1956, June
1957, and October 1957) were not publicly disseminated at all. This policy of
strict secrecy was eased during the final years of Khrushchev’s tenure, when
edited “stenographic accounts” of some plenums were published. Although the
appearance of these transcripts was a major step forward, the accounts did not
always enable readers to determine precisely what went on at the plenums.
Moreover, the publication of stenographic accounts ceased in March 1965, five
months after Leonid Brezhnev displaced Khrushchev; and from that point until
the end of the 1980s information about Central Committee plenums was as
exiguous as it had been in Stalin’s time. The lone exception came in June 1983
during Iurii Andropov’s brief tenure as CPSU General Secretary, when the
stenographic account of a plenum was released and published.
 
9
 
 Aside from that,
the only materials released during the two decades under Brezhnev and
his immediate successors, Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko (and even
during the first few years of the Gorbachev era), were brief announcements
(
 
informatsionnye soobshcheniia
 
) that Central Committee plenums had been held,
lists of those who had spoken, and the resolutions (
 
postanovleniia
 
) and theses
(
 
tezisy
 
) adopted by the plenums, which revealed nothing about the tenor of the
meetings and the documents used there.
 
10
 
 The opening of 
 
fond
 
 2 thus fills an
important gap in the historical record.
Nevertheless, scholars who use the newly declassified plenum materials should
bear in mind a number of caveats. First, it is important to recognize that the Central
 
9. 
 
Plenum Tsentral’nogo Komiteta KPSS, 14-15 iiunia 1983 goda. Stenograficheskii otchet
 
(Moscow: Politizdat, 1983).
10. Useful compilations of the materials published after Central Committee plenums from 1953
through the late 1980s are available in two sources: 
 
Kommunisticheskaia partiia Sovetskogo
Soiuza v rezoliutsiiakh i resheniiakh s”ezdov, konferentsii, i plenumov TsK
 
, various editions
(Moscow: Politizdat, various years); and the 29 volumes of the CPSU yearbook published
between 1957 and 1989, 
 
Spravochnik partiinogo rabotnika
 
 (Moscow: Politizdat, published
biennially until the mid-1960s and annually thereafter). From 1989 to 1991, the new Central
Committee journal 
 
Izvestiia TsK KPSS
 
 featured stenographic accounts of selected plenums,
including some from the pre-Gorbachev era.
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Committee was not a decision-making body.
 
11
 
 The list of plenums in 
 
opis’
 
 1,
provided above, underscores just how limited the Central Committee’s role was in
Soviet policy-making, especially during the Stalin era, when the Central
Committee almost never met. During the final twelve years of Stalin’s life, the
Central Committee convened only six times, for a total of ten days. The extremely
infrequent and perfunctory nature of Central Committee plenums was part of
Stalin’s general policy of weakening subordinate structures that might in some way
infringe on his immense personal power. Under Khrushchev, the frequency of
plenums increased, but the Central Committee still convened no more than a total
of fifteen days in a given year, and usually far less. Moreover, the timing of
plenums did not settle into a particular pattern. All members of the Central
Committee had full-time jobs elsewhere, which consumed the vast bulk of their
energies and attention.
Even on the rare occasions when the Central Committee met, it usually
functioned as little more than a rubber stamp for the Presidium/
 
Politbiuro
 
’s
decisions. As interesting and valuable as the plenum documents are, they clearly
show that, with the exception of the June 1957 plenum, all key decisions had been
arranged in advance by the Presidium/
 
Politbiuro
 
, which met shortly before the
plenums to iron out any differences and approve the plenum agenda and resolutions.
It is telling that in some instances the drafts of resolutions, prepared several days
before the Central Committee convened, would already say that the resolutions had
been “adopted unanimously” — a result that clearly was not in doubt.
 
12
 
The June 1957 plenum was a special case because Khrushchev had been
outvoted on the Presidium by what became known as the “Anti-Party Group.”
During a session of the Presidium from 18 to 21 June 1957, only three of the ten
other full Presidium members — Anastas Mikoian, Mikhail Suslov, and Aleksei
Kirichenko — had supported Khrushchev. Through last-ditch maneuvers,
Khrushchev was able to stave off his dismissal by forcing the convocation on
22 June of a Central Committee plenum, which he knew would take his side in the
dispute. That session marked the only time from the mid-1920s onward when the
top leaders had failed to reach a consensus beforehand about the results they hoped
to achieve at the plenum.
The fact that the general outcomes of the plenums were arranged in advance
does not mean that the discussions were dull and lacking in substance. On the
 
11. The term “Central Committee” refers here exclusively to the body comprising 200-
300 people who convened for plenums. Even when plenums were not in session, many
resolutions and directives were issued in the name of the Central Committee, but these were
actually drafted and approved by the 
 
Politbiuro
 
 or Secretariat, not by the Central Committee
itself. Soviet officials also frequently used the term “Central Committee” to refer to the whole
central party apparatus, but this, too, gives a misleading impression of the Central Committee’s
role. The term is used here only in its narrowest sense.
12. See, for example, the marked-up draft “Postanovlenie Plenuma TsK KPSS. Ob uluchshenii
partiino-politicheskoi raboty v Sovetskoi Armii i Flote,” October 1957 (Secret), in “Materialy k
Protokolu No. 5 zasedaniia Plenuma TsK KPSS 28-29. 10. 1957 g.,” TsKhSD, f. 2, op. 1,
d. 261, ll. 69-74.
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contrary, in many cases the debates were very lively and the top leaders provided
important information to the rank-and-file Central Committee members about
salient issues and controversies. Even so, it is clear from the transcripts and other
materials that the Presidium/
 
Politbiuro carefully stage-managed and orchestrated
the plenums to produce a desired result. The plenums were extremely useful for the
top leaders in many ways — by giving ordinary Central Committee members a
sense of involvement in the policy-making process, by ensuring wide support
within the party for the top leaders’ policies and objectives, and by conferring a
formal stamp of legitimacy on the Presidium/Politbiuro’s actions — but this does
not change the basic fact that key decisions were actually made by the Presidium/
Politbiuro, not by the Central Committee.
The highly circumscribed nature of the Central Committee’s role was broadly
understood even before any of the plenum materials were declassified. It is not at all
surprising that the plenum transcripts would confirm that the Central Committee
routinely complied with the Presidium/Politbiuro’s wishes. The notion of a
“circular flow of power” — whereby the top party leader and his allies chose (and
had the power to dismiss) lower-ranking personnel, who in turn were empowered to
vote for delegates to the party congress, who in turn elected the members of the
Central Committee, who in turn were responsible for electing the highest party
organs — had long enabled Western scholars to understand why the Central
Committee, despite nominally being empowered to countermand the Presidium/
Politbiuro, instead was staunchly supportive of the top leaders’ preferences.13 The
members of the Central Committee had an in-built incentive to be loyal, resting on
self-interest.
The thing that researchers need to bear in mind, then, is that the sudden
availability of the plenum materials should not lead to an exaggeration of the
Central Committee’s role. The documents must be seen in context. Some of the
plenum transcripts and supplementary materials contain valuable information that
is not readily available from other declassified documents, and this will be of great
benefit. But unless the plenums are evaluated against the wider backdrop of Soviet
politics (in which the Presidium/Politbiuro was the dominant organ), there is a
danger that some scholars will end up “looking for their keys where the streetlight
is.”14
This temptation may be particularly strong because the vast majority of records
of Presidium/Politbiuro meetings from the post-Stalin era have not yet been
released. Detailed notes from Presidium meetings during the Khrushchev era,
13. The term “circular flow of power” was coined by Robert V. Daniels in “Soviet politics since
Khrushchev,” in John W. Strong, ed., The Soviet Union under Brezhnev and Kosygin (New
York: Van Nostrand — Reinhold, 1971): 20. Daniels had developed the basic interpretation at
some length more than a decade earlier in his The conscience of the Revolution (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), and similar views had been elaborated by numerous
scholars such as Merle Fainsod and Leonard Schapiro.
14. On this general problem, see Mark Kramer, “Archival research in Moscow: Progress and
pitfalls,” Cold War International History Bulletin, 3 (Fall 1993): 34.
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compiled by the head of the CPSU CC General Department, Vladimir Malin,
exist in fond 3 at TsKhSD, but only a tiny fraction of these had been released as of
mid-1999, despite earlier promises that the full collection would be declassified by
the end of 1996.15 Verbatim transcripts were kept for Politbiuro meetings during the
Brezhnev era and afterwards, but only a minuscule portion of these have been
released so far. In late 1991 and 1992, some Politbiuro transcripts (or portions of
transcripts) were declassified for a short-lived trial of the Soviet Communist Party
at the Russian Constitutional Court.16 The bulk of the selected transcripts were from
the Gorbachev era (mainly because Russian president Boris El’tsin hoped they
would embarrass Gorbachev), but even these materials represented only a small
fraction of the sessions held between 1985 and 1991. Although a few additional
Politbiuro transcripts from the Gorbachev era have been published since the early
1990s — some were put out by the Gorbachev Foundation to offset the impact of
the materials released by the El’tsin administration, and others were featured in the
Russian archival service’s journal Istochnik — these scattered documents are no
substitute for access to the full collection.17 Moreover, only a handful of transcripts
have been released for Politbiuro meetings from the Brezhnev, Andropov, and
Chernenko periods (though a few well-placed Russian officials have been given
access to the full collection of transcripts). The unavailability of most of the
Politbiuro notes and transcripts may create at least some temptation to ascribe too
large a role to the Central Committee and other agencies whose records are now
available.
The dominance of the CPSU Presidium/Politbiuro in the Soviet policy-making
process was necessarily reflected in the Central Committee plenums. The context
of each plenum can be understood only by answering several questions: What was
the Presidium/Politbiuro hoping to derive from the plenum? Why did the
Presidium/Politbiuro decide to convene the Central Committee? What steps were
taken to ensure that the plenum bolstered the Presidium/Politbiuro’s aims? So long
as the Politbiuro’s records remain largely sealed, definitive answers to these
questions may not always be possible; but the transcripts of the plenums and other
15. For an analysis and translation of these notes and supplementary materials, see Mark
Kramer, “Special feature: New evidence on Soviet decision-making and the 1956 Polish and
Hungarian crises,” Cold War International History Bulletin, 8-9 (Winter 1996-1997): 358-410.
16. Almost all of the transcripts that were released in the early 1990s are now accessible in fond
89 of TsKhSD. For a convenient, cross-indexed, and chronological list of these transcripts
compiled by I. I. Kudriavtsev and edited by V. P. Kozlov, see Arkhivy Kremlia i Staroi
ploshchadi. Dokumenty po “delu KPSS.” Annotirovannyi spravochnik dokumentov,
predstavlennykh v Konstitutsionnyi sud RF po “delu KPSS” (Novosibirsk: Sibirskii
khronograf, 1995).
17. The two most valuable collections put out by the Gorbachev Foundation are Mikhail
Gorbachev, ed., Gody trudnykh reshenii (Moscow: Alfa-Print, 1993); and A. V. Veber et al.,
eds., Soiuz mozhno bylo sokhranit’. Belaia kniga. Dokumenty i fakty o politike M. S.
Gorbacheva po reformirovaniiu i sokhraneniiu mnogonatsional’nogo gosudarstva (Moscow:
Aprel’-85, 1995). Some relevant items also have appeared in the Foundation’s journal
Svobodnaia mysl’. The items published in Istochnik (e.g., about the Politbiuro’s immediate
reaction to the Chernobyl accident) seem to have been released for the same reason that
materials were turned over earlier to the Constitutional Court.
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documents often permit well-founded conclusions. For example, it is now clear that
the plenum in early July 1953 which denounced the “criminal anti-party and anti-
state activities of [Lavrentii] Beria” was convened by Beria’s rivals to reassure the
Central Committee that Beria’s arrest had been a matter of high principle, and not
simply part of a power struggle. The Presidium members who had ordered Beria’s
arrest outdid one another at the plenum in recounting the alleged iniquities of their
deposed colleague, accusing him of actions that they themselves had initiated (or at
least strongly backed) during the previous few months. Khrushchev, Viacheslav
Molotov, Georgii Malenkov, Nikolai Bulganin, and their allies orchestrated the
plenum to cover up their own roles in promoting policies for which they were now
holding Beria solely accountable. So egregious was their abrupt disavowal of their
own actions and views that the plenum often took on a surreal quality.18 The rank-
and-file members of the Central Committee, having long been accustomed to
accept whatever they were told by the highest party authorities, went along
obediently this time as well.
The stenographic account of the July 1953 plenum was declassified and
published in early 1991, and it has been cited by many Western and Russian
scholars since then.19 Unfortunately, most of these scholars have failed to take
due account of the context of the plenum. Rather than seeing the plenum for what
it was — namely, an attempt by Beria’s rivals to rationalize their actions by
blaming the ousted security chief for a host of purported “crimes” — many
researchers have taken at face value the allegations made against Beria. This has
been especially true of the claims about Beria’s supposed effort to “destroy the
people’s democratic regime in [East Germany].” Beria’s real views about
Germany in the spring of 1953 bore little resemblance to the accusations lodged
against him. It was Molotov, not Beria, who had taken the lead in forging the new
Soviet policy toward Germany after Stalin’s death, and all the other top Soviet
officials, including Beria, had supported him.20 The views attributed to Beria
were contrived by Molotov to gloss over his own responsibility for having
drastically reshaped Soviet Deutschlandpolitik just before the June 1953 uprising
in East Germany. Numerous Western and Russian scholars who have used the
18. In a typical case, Khrushchev attributed to Beria “dangerous and counterrevolutionary”
policies that Khrushchev himself had devised only a few weeks earlier for Latvia, Estonia, and
Moldavia. See “Voprosy Latviiskoi SSR (Proekt),” 7 June 1953 (Top Secret), “Voprosy
Estonskoi SSR (Proekt),” 8 June 1953 (Top Secret), and “Voprosy Moldavskoi SSR (Proekt),”
8 June 1953, all from N. S. Khrushchev to the CPSU Presidium, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 30, d. 6,
ll. 20-29; f. 5, op. 15, d. 445, ll. 46, 267-277; and f. 5, op. 15, d. 443, ll. 29-59, respectively.
19. For the published version, see “Delo Beriia,” two parts, in Izvestiia TsK KPSS, 1 (January
1991): 139-214, and 2 (February 1991): 141-208. As discussed below, the published
stenographic account differs substantially from the verbatim transcript, though the comments
here apply just as much to the verbatim transcript.
20. For extensive evidence of this, see my two-part article on “The early post-Stalin succession
struggle and upheavals in East-Central Europe: Internal-external linkages in Soviet policy-
making,” Journal of Cold War Studies, 1, 1 (Winter 1999): 3-55 and 1, 2 (Spring-Summer
1999), forthcoming.
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published stenographic account of the July 1953 plenum have been far too
accepting of Molotov’s tendentious portrayal of Beria and Germany.21
The misunderstandings that have arisen from the declassified account of the July
1953 Central Committee plenum underscore the need for circumspection when
drawing on the materials in fond 2. Unless scholars constantly bear in mind the
purpose and context of each plenum, they risk going astray in their interpretations
of substantive issues as well as of the dynamics of Soviet policy-making.
One additional problem that researchers may encounter when using the new
plenum materials is the distortions that sometimes crept in during the editing of the
Central Committee transcripts. As noted above, fond 2 contains two or more versions
of most of the plenums. For research purposes, the most useful version is the
“author’s copy,” which contains a verbatim transcript with handwritten changes and
handwritten or typed insertions. This version of the transcript enables scholars to see
both the original proceedings and the changes that senior officials wanted to make. If
scholars consult only the “corrected copy” or the “stenographic account,” they are
likely to miss some important nuances in the original proceedings. For example, by
the time a stenographic account was issued for the July 1953 plenum, numerous
modifications had been made to cast as sinister a light as possible on Beria’s actions.
A comparison with the verbatim transcript shows that, among other things, Beria’s
views about Germany were depicted in far more extreme terms in the edited account.
At one point in the verbatim transcript, Molotov claimed that Beria had supported a
united Germany “which will be peaceloving and under the control of the four
powers.”22 (Molotov conveniently neglected to mention that this was precisely the
position he himself had long supported.) To be on the safe side, the words “and under
the control of the four powers” were omitted from the stenographic account, thus
implying that Beria had wanted the Soviet Union simply to abandon East Germany.
Numerous other changes of this sort were made, including some of much greater
length. All of them were designed to bring even greater discredit upon Beria.
For most of the other plenums as well, extensive changes were made in the
transcripts before stenographic accounts were issued. In some cases lengthy
portions were rewritten, and several new paragraphs or even new pages were
added. On occasion, entirely new speeches were inserted.23 The finished product is
valuable, indeed essential, for scholars to consult, but it can be highly misleading
unless it is compared with the verbatim transcript. Only the “author’s copy” permits
researchers to examine simultaneously the original proceedings and the subsequent
21. Even a prominent scholar like Amy Knight, who is deservedly skeptical of many of the
charges lodged against Beria, uncritically accepts the statements made about East Germany. See
her Beria: Stalin’s first lieutenant (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993): 193-200.
22. “Plenum Tsentral’nogo Komiteta KPSS, 2-7 iiulia 1953 g.,” July 1953 (Strictly Secret),
TsKhSD, f. 2, op. 1, d. 29, l. 51.
23. This was the case, for example, with the plenum on 24-26 March 1965. A new, 22-page text
was inserted by Mikhail Suslov in place of his original report to the plenum, “Soobshchenie ob
itogakh Konsul’tativnoi vstrechi kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partii,” TsKhSD, f. 2, op. 1,
d. 766, ll. 81-102. Suslov indicated at the bottom of the new version that “[t]his text should be
used in place of the stenogram.”
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editing.24 If that version is not available, it is important to look at both the
“uncorrected stenogram” and the “stenographic account.” In a few cases (e.g., the
December 1959 plenum) these two versions do not differ markedly, but in the large
majority of cases the differences can be of great importance.
Selected plenum highlights
Most of the Central Committee plenums between 1941 and 1966 had no direct
bearing on foreign policy. Instead they focused on agricultural policy, economic
problems, local party management, and the like. A number of the plenums,
however, dealt at length with foreign policy issues. Some plenums covered two or
more topics, both external and internal, whereas other plenums focused exclusively
on important foreign developments. Plenums that approved changes (or impending
changes) in the leadership, as in March 1953, July 1953, January 1955, June 1957,
October 1957, and October 1964, also are of great importance for studies of the
Cold War. In a brief article of this sort it would be impossible to give an exhaustive
overview of the many issues covered by the plenums, but a few highlights will
suffice to indicate how rich some of the material is.
Intensity of the post-Stalin leadership struggle
One of the most intriguing aspects of the plenums from 1953 through 1957 is what
they reveal about the leadership struggle. Western observers had long surmised that
a fierce struggle was under way behind the scenes, but the only direct evidence for
this at the time was the occasional announcement that a senior official had been
dismissed or demoted. The declassified transcripts of Central Committee plenums,
as well as other new documents and first-hand accounts, reveal that the leadership
struggle was even more intense than most analysts had suspected. At some
plenums, notably those in July 1953, when the Central Committee denounced
Beria, in January 1955, when Malenkov came under sharp criticism prior to his
dismissal as prime minister, in February 1956, when preparations were under way
for Khrushchev’s “secret speech” condemning Stalin, in June 1957, when
Khrushchev ousted the Anti-Party Group, and in October 1957, when Khrushchev
24. Sometimes, the changes that turn up can be both amusing and revealing about events and
individual leaders. For example, at the plenum in late October 1957, a few weeks after the
Soviet “Sputnik” had been launched into orbit, Khrushchev boasted that “We now have
European missiles, which can strike targets all over Europe without leaving our territory.” In
the left-hand margin of the verbatim transcript, the first editor wrote a large question mark next
to this passage. The second editor changed it to read: “We now have medium-range missiles,
that is, European missiles, which can strike targets all over Europe after being launched from
our territory.” See the marked-up verbatim transcript “Rech’ tov. N. S. Khrushcheva na
Plenume TsK KPSS, 29 oktiabria 1957 goda,” 29 October 1957 (Strictly Secret), in “Plenum
TsK KPSS, oktiabr’ 1957 goda: Stenogramma chetvertogo zasedaniia Plenuma TsK KPSS,”
TsKhSD, f. 2, op. 1, d. 269, l. 66 (hereafter: “Rech’ tov. N. S. Khrushcheva”).
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removed his erstwhile ally and defense minister, Marshal Georgii Zhukov, the
leadership struggle dominated the sessions. Yet even at plenums that were
ostensibly convened for other reasons, the ferocity of the leadership struggle often
affected the entire proceedings.
One of the best examples came at the lengthy plenum in July 1955, which
focused on several topics, including the recent rapprochement with Yugoslavia.
During the debate about Yugoslavia, one of Khrushchev’s chief rivals, Viacheslav
Molotov, came under fierce attack. At this juncture, barely a year-and-a-half after
Beria had been executed, the prospect of losing out in the power struggle still
implied potentially grave risks. Even so, Molotov largely held his ground and only
grudgingly, at the very end of the plenum, sought to propitiate his attackers. The
segment of the plenum that dealt with Yugoslavia featured a lengthy (138-page)
opening speech by Khrushchev, which provided a detailed, highly informative
(albeit selective and tendentious) overview of the reasons for the Soviet-Yugoslav
split under Stalin.25 (Much of the blame was laid on “the provocative role of Beria
and Abakumov.”) Toward the end of the speech, Khrushchev revealed to the
Central Committee that the Presidium had “unanimously” decided to report that
Molotov had “consistently adopted an incorrect position” on the Yugoslav question
and had “refused to disavow his incorrect views.”26 Khrushchev read aloud the
Presidium’s conclusion that “Cde. Molotov’s position on the Yugoslav matter does
not serve the interests of the Soviet state and the socialist camp and does not
conform with the principles of Leninist policy.”
Khrushchev’s comments touched off a spate of denunciations of Molotov’s
views on Yugoslavia. One such attack came from Georgii Malenkov, who, despite
having lost his post as prime minister four months earlier, was still a key figure on
the CPSU Presidium:
“If we speak about Cde. Molotov’s main mistake, I would say it is that, contrary
to new facts and contrary to everything that has happened over the past two
years — and contrary to the overwhelmingly positive results that the CC
Presidium has achieved from the steps it has taken to develop friendly relations
with Yugoslavia — contrary to all this, he persists in embracing the position laid
out by him and by Comrade Stalin in 1948-1949 in their letters to the Yugoslav
leadership.”27
Malenkov emphasized that “Cde Molotov still does not acknowledge that his errors
in the tactics of struggle played a huge and decisive role in bringing about the split
with Yugoslavia.” Malenkov noted that Molotov had “blatantly disregarded the
25. Khrushchev’s speech, “Doklad Pervogo sekretaria TsK KPSS Khrushcheva N. S. ‘Ob
itogakh sovetsko-iugoslavskikh peregovorov’,” is in “Plenum TsK KPSS, XIX Sozyv:
Stenogramma desiatogo zasedaniia 9 iiulia 1955 g. (utrennego),” July 1955 (Strictly Secret),
TsKhSD, f. 2, op. 1, d. 172, ll. 1-138.
26. Ibid., l. 105.
27. “Plenum TsK KPSS, XIX Sozyv: Stenogramma trinadtsatogo zasedaniia 11 iiulia 1955 g.
(vechernego),” July 1955 (Strictly Secret), TsKhSD, f. 2, op. 1, d. 175, ll. 135-136.
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instructions of the CC Presidium” during the preparations for the rapprochement
with Yugoslavia, adding that “this is typical of him.” Molotov’s views, according
to Malenkov, were “weakening the forces of the camp of socialism and
strengthening the forces of the imperialist camp.” Malenkov “demanded from
[Molotov] a full-fledged explanation and a statement about his obligation to rectify
his behavior and to disavow his erroneous views in an unequivocal manner.”28
Some of the other condemnations of Molotov during the sessions on
Yugoslavia extended far beyond the Yugoslav question alone. Maksim Saburov
argued that Molotov’s “ridiculous” position on Yugoslavia was “one in a long
series of issues on which Cde. Molotov does not agree with the CC Presidium.”
Saburov cited the virgin lands scheme (which, he said, Molotov believed would
be a “largely ineffective and dubious pursuit”), the new planning system for
agriculture, the negotiations on the Austrian State Treaty, and the appointment of
a new prime minister as issues “on which Cde. Molotov disagreed with the
principled and correct stance adopted by the CC Presidium.”29 Saburov claimed
that Molotov’s “deviations” on these matters were far from innocent, being
“directed against Cde. Khrushchev. [...] I personally believe that Cde. Molotov
regards Cde. Khrushchev as an unsuitable official.” Saburov then likened
Molotov to Beria and implied that Khrushchev should deal with Molotov in the
same way they had treated Beria:
“I don’t want to say that Cde. Molotov is simply repeating what Beria said; I’m
not equating him with Beria, but this is indeed like what we heard from Beria.
Cde. Molotov, by the logic of his struggle, objected to any question considered
by the CC that had been proposed — coincidentally or not so coincidentally —
by Cde. Khrushchev. I believe that one might draw the conclusion that Cde.
Molotov would not be objecting to these proposals if Cde. Khrushchev did not
enjoy the level of trust and support that everyone has in him.”30
Coming so soon after the execution of Beria, Saburov’s statements clearly were
intended as a threat, which may well have been coordinated with Khrushchev. On
some matters, Saburov certainly was acting at Khrushchev’s behest, and the whole
speech was designed not only to deprecate Molotov, but to bolster Khrushchev’s
standing. Saburov insisted that he was not trying “to give undue glory to Cde.
Khrushchev; he doesn’t need that sort of glorification. We know that he commands
trust not only in the Presidium, but in our whole party,” a line that drew sustained
applause.
By the end of the plenum, when sharp exchanges ensued between Khrushchev
and Molotov just before Khrushchev’s closing speech (which “condemned the line
advanced by Cde. Molotov as inimical to our party and a non-Leninist and sectarian
position”), it was clear that Molotov had experienced a major setback. But what is
28. Ibid., l. 149.
29. Ibid., ll. 172-183.
30. Ibid., l. 179.
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perhaps most striking, in view of the intense criticism Molotov encountered, is that
he was able to hold onto his position for another two years and that he very nearly
won out over Khrushchev in June 1957. The transcript of the July 1955 plenum thus
provides crucial evidence that Khrushchev, despite having consolidated his
position a good deal, had by no means overcome his most formidable challenger.
Anyone who could withstand and recover from the attacks that Molotov endured
during the July 1955 plenum was obviously well-suited to be a constant threat.
Fissures in the Communist world (I): Yugoslavia and Poland
Quite apart from what the plenum documents reveal about the post-Stalin
leadership struggle, they shed intriguing light on the priorities of Soviet foreign
policy. One thing that quickly becomes evident from the 822 files in opis’ 1 is the
importance that CPSU officials attached to ideological relations with other
Communist countries. Although no plenums dealt at length with the crises in East
Germany in 1953 and Poland and Hungary in 1956 (in contrast to the much more
prolonged crisis with Czechoslovakia in 1968-1969, which was the main subject of
three separate plenums), numerous plenums during the Khrushchev and early
Brezhnev periods focused exclusively, or at least extensively, on the nettlesome
problem of relations with Yugoslavia, China, and the world Communist movement.
The momentous decision to seek a rapprochement with Yugoslavia in May 1955
was regarded as such an abrupt and, from the ideological standpoint, potentially
disorienting change of course that Soviet leaders believed they should explain the
move to the full Central Committee.31 At a plenum in July 1955, Khrushchev and
numerous other Presidium members laid out the basic rationale — that “because of
serious mistakes we lost Yugoslavia [my poteriali Iugoslaviiu] and the enemy camp
has begun to lure that country over to its side” — and emphasized the “enormous
importance of winning back our former loyal ally.” Not surprisingly, the Central
Committee voted unanimously in support of the Presidium’s actions.
Similarly, in later years when tensions reemerged with Yugoslavia (in large
part because of the crises in 1956), Khrushchev and his colleagues again believed
it wise to explain these tensions to the Central Committee. One such occasion
came in December 1957, when a plenum was convened to inform Central
Committee members about a two-part conference held in Moscow the previous
month to mark the 40th anniversary of the Bolshevik takeover. The leaders of the
thirteen ruling Communist parties had been invited to the first part of the
conference on 14-16 November, but Yugoslav officials had declined to take part.
When the other twelve parties met and issued a statement reaffirming the CPSU’s
preeminent role in the world Communist movement, Yugoslav leaders refused to
31. The sessions on Yugoslavia in July 1955 were designed to inform the Central Committee
about actions already taken, not to consult it in advance. This is fully in line with the analysis
above of the Central Committee’s role in Soviet policy-making.
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endorse it.32 At the CPSU Central Committee plenum a few weeks after the
conference, one of the highest-ranking party officials, Mikhail Suslov, who was
broadly responsible for ideology and intra-bloc relations, explained to the
members that “Yugoslavia’s failure to participate [...] attests to the continuing
ideological disagreements between the League of Communists of Yugoslavia
[LCY] and the other Communist parties of the socialist countries.”33 He cited
several areas in which “ideological disagreements remain”: the “unwillingness of
the Yugoslav comrades to speak about a socialist camp, especially a socialist
camp headed by the Soviet Union”; the desire of the Yugoslav authorities to
“play their own special and exalted role between West and East”; and the “unduly
close relationship” Yugoslavia had established with the United States, a country
that was “applying pressure” on the Yugoslavs to “serve as a counterweight to the
Soviet Union.” Although he insisted that “we have not retreated, and will not
retreat, one step from our fundamental positions,” he assured the Central
Committee that “Yugoslavia’s failure to sign the Declaration does not mean that
our relations have deteriorated. [...] There is no need to stir up new tensions.”34
When the matter came up again five months later, at a plenum on 7 May 1958,
Soviet officials were less accommodating. Although the plenum dealt mostly with
other matters, Khrushchev initiated a discussion about Yugoslavia toward the end
of the third session.35 He argued that the recent LCY congress had been a “step back
toward revisionist, anti-party, and anti-Marxist positions,” and he condemned
Yugoslavia’s close ties with Imre Nagy, the Hungarian leader who had been
removed during the Soviet invasion of Hungary in November 1956 and who was
put to death in Hungary in June 1958, a few weeks after the CPSU Central
Committee plenum. Khrushchev also denounced statements by the Yugoslav
leader, Josip Broz Tito, particularly a speech Tito had given in Pula on
11 November 1956, which raised serious concerns about the Soviet intervention in
Hungary. Khrushchev informed the Central Committee that the CPSU Presidium
had decided not to send a delegation to the LCY congress after the Yugoslavs had
changed the agenda at the last minute. He received lengthy applause from the
Central Committee when he affirmed that the Soviet Union would continue to offer
“principled and constructive criticism” of Yugoslav policy whenever necessary.
It may seem peculiar that Khrushchev would have included these detailed
comments about Yugoslavia after a plenum that had dealt with agricultural policy,
but his remarks are indicative of the efforts that Soviet leaders made to ensure
strong, unwavering support within the CPSU for the latest ideological twists and
32. “Deklaratsiia Soveshchaniia predstavitelei kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partii
sotsialisticheskikh stran, sostaiavshegosia v Moskve 14-16 noiabria 1957 goda,” Pravda
(November 22, 1957): 1-2.
33. “Plenum TsK KPSS, XX Sozyv: Stenogramma tret’ego i chetvertogo zasedanii plenuma
TsK KPSS 16-17 dekabria 1957 g.,” TsKhSD, f. 2, op. 1, d. 282, ll. 161-182.
34. Ibid., l. 172
35. “Plenum TsK KPSS, XX Sozyv: Stenogramma tret’ego zasedaniia 7 maia 1958 g.
(vechernego),” May 1958 (Top Secret), TsKhSD, f. 2, op. 1, d. 317, ll. 57-93.
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turns in relations with Yugoslavia. This is one of many instances in which
documents from the former Soviet archives reveal that Yugoslavia was a more
important factor for Soviet leaders during the Cold War than most Western
observers had realized.36
The plenum documents also reveal that Yugoslavia was not the only East
European country that complicated Moscow’s efforts in the late 1950s to unite the
world Communist movement under explicit Soviet leadership. The standoff with
Poland in October 1956 had induced Khrushchev to reach a modus vivendi with the
Polish leader, W∏adys∏aw Gomu∏ka, which provided for Poland’s continued
status as a loyal member of the Soviet political and military bloc.37 This
arrangement was briefly strained in late October and early November 1956 when
Gomu∏ka insisted on the withdrawal of Marshal Konstantin Rokossowski, the
Soviet officer who had been serving as Polish defense minister for the previous
seven years; but Khrushchev eventually acceded to Gomu∏ka’s demand. Despite
this breakthrough, the plenum materials confirm that Soviet-Polish relations were
still marred by occasional frictions. Suslov’s report at the December 1957 plenum
indicated that the Polish representatives at the world conference of Communist
parties in Moscow had been at odds with the Soviet Union on a number of key
issues:
“During the preparation of the documents — the Declaration and the Peace
Manifesto — the Polish comrades tried to introduce their own slant by ensuring
there was no reference to the leading role of the Soviet Union and by avoiding
harsh attacks against imperialism, especially against American imperialism.
They steadfastly objected to the passage in the Declaration that said American
imperialism has become the center of international reaction. The Polish
comrades argued that the peculiar circumstances they face in Poland do not yet
enable them to embrace the formula ‘under the leadership of the Soviet Union.’
They claimed that the Declaration is supposedly too bellicose a document and
that it could damage relations with the imperialists.”38
Suslov also complained that the Polish delegation’s draft of the so-called Peace
Manifesto, the document that was due to be approved by the 64 Communist parties
attending the second phase of the conference (on 16-19 November), was “seriously
deficient” because “it made no mention of where the threat of war originated.” He
emphasized that the “document prepared by the Polish comrades had to be
36. Among numerous other examples of the important ideological role that Yugoslavia played
in Soviet policy-making was the close attention that Soviet leaders paid in 1968 to
Yugoslavia’s influence on the reformist officials in Czechoslovakia. See, for example, the
plethora of documents in TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 60, d. 279, 284. Whenever Soviet leaders detected
hints (or what they construed as hints) that “Titoist” ideology was filtering into
Czechoslovakia, they raised the issue with the Czechoslovak authorities and discussed the
matter at length during CPSU Politbiuro meetings.
37. See M. Kramer, “Special feature...,” art. cit.: 360-362.
38. “Plenum TsK KPSS, XX Sozyv: Stenogramma tret’ego i chetvertogo zasedanii plenuma
TsK KPSS 16-17 dekabria 1957 g.,” TsKhSD, f. 2, op. 1, d. 282, ll. 173-174.
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drastically revised” because “the representatives of the other fraternal parties
[including the CPSU] did not support the Polish comrades on even a single point
that they raised.”
Suslov did not directly impugn the motives of the Polish authorities, but he
maintained that “these allusions to some sort of special circumstances in their country
don’t seem particularly convincing.” Khrushchev, for his part, implied that the main
reason Polish officials did not want to antagonize the United States is that they were
uncertain whether U.S. banks would “still give credits” to Poland if relations
deteriorated.39 Despite these skeptical comments, both Suslov and Khrushchev
acknowledged that “the important thing is that the Polish comrades in the end signed
the Declaration, which undoubtedly will have an enormous impact in Poland.”
In subsequent years, especially after the emergence of the Sino-Soviet split in
the 1960s, Gomu∏ka came more closely into line with the Soviet point of view.
Even so, the plenum materials indicate that Khrushchev remained concerned that
the defiance Gomu∏ka displayed in 1956 and the unorthodox positions he adopted
in 1957 might someday resurface.
Fissures in the Communist world (II): China and Albania
As important as the ideological challenge posed by Yugoslavia may have been, it
was nothing compared to the rift that emerged with China at the end of the 1950s.
From December 1959 on, an inordinately large number of Central Committee
plenums were devoted to the subject of China and the world Communist movement.
At a plenum on 22-26 December 1959, Suslov presented a detailed report on “the trip
by a Soviet party-state delegation to the People’s Republic of China” in October
1959.40 This report, which had been commissioned by the CPSU Presidium on
15 October (shortly after Khrushchev and the other members of the delegation had
returned to Moscow) and was approved in a draft version by the Presidium on
18 December, gave many Central Committee members the first direct inkling they
had received of how serious the incipient problems with China were. Although
Suslov’s report did not feature the strident rhetoric and harsh polemics that would
soon characterize Sino-Soviet relations, he spoke at length about the “dangerously
foolish ideas of the Chinese comrades,” the “egregious economic and intra-party
mistakes committed by the Chinese comrades,” and the “acute disagreements”
between Moscow and Beijing on “basic matters of socialist construction.”
39. Ibid., l. 174.
40. ”O poezdke sovetskoi partiino-pravitel’stvennoi delegatsii v Kitaiskuiu Narodnuiu
Respubliku,” plus extensive modifications and insertions incorporated by Suslov, in “Materialy
k Protokolu No. 15 zasedaniia Plenuma TsK KPSS,” 22-26 December 1959 (Strictly Secret),
TsKhSD, f. 2, op. 1, d. 447, ll. 57-91. For background on this trip, see Mark Kramer, “Sino-
Soviet relations on the eve of the split,” Cold War International History Bulletin, 6-7 (Winter
1995-1996): 170-186.
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In addition to highlighting ideological differences, Suslov enumerated many
“foreign policy issues on which major disagreements have surfaced between us and
the Chinese comrades,” including Mao Zedong’s rhetorical dismissal of nuclear
weapons as “a paper tiger” (a claim that, in Suslov’s view, was “leading the
Chinese people to believe that a nuclear war would be an easy matter and that no
preparations were needed”); China’s aversion to peaceful coexistence with the
United States (a policy that, according to Suslov, Chinese leaders “regard as merely
a convenient tactical maneuver” rather than a “profound Leninist principle”);
China’s clumsy handling of negotiations with Japan; the recent exacerbation of
tensions between China and India despite Moscow’s efforts to mediate (efforts
which, Suslov complained, had “not been matched by the requisite understanding
on the part of Chinese leaders” because “the Chinese comrades cannot properly
evaluate their own mistakes”); and the deterioration of China’s relations with
Indonesia, Burma, Thailand, and other East Asian countries (a trend that, in
Suslov’s view, had left China “isolated in the international arena”). Of particular
interest were Suslov’s comments about Mao’s “completely incomprehensible”
retreat during the Sino-American crisis that erupted in August 1958 when China
began bombarding the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu in the Taiwan Straits:
“We [in Moscow] regarded it as our internationalist duty to come out decisively
in support of the fraternal Chinese people, with whom our country is bound by
alliance obligations. According to secret documents that we had intercepted, it
had become clear that the ruling circles in America were already psychologically
prepared to relinquish the offshore islands to the PRC. However, after
precipitating an extreme situation in the vicinity of the offshore islands and
making far-reaching statements, the Chinese comrades backed down at the
critical moment. [...] It is obvious that in backing down, the Chinese comrades
squandered things. The perception abroad was that they had caved in.”41
In all these respects, Suslov argued, “the Chinese comrades are at odds with the
common foreign policy line of the socialist camp. The lack of needed coordination
between the two most powerful Communist parties on questions of foreign policy is
abnormal.”42
After recounting this litany of “serious disagreements,” Suslov emphasized that
long-standing efforts to increase the appearance and reality of unity within the
socialist camp made it imperative to curtail China’s deviations in foreign policy:
“The incorrect actions of one of the socialist countries affects the international
situation of the entire socialist camp. We must bear in mind that imperialist
propaganda directly links the actions of the Chinese comrades with the policy of
41. “O poezdke sovetskoi partiino-pravitel’stvennoi delegatsii v Kitaiskuiu Narodnuiu
Respubliku,” (see Note 40 supra), l. 71. The sentence referring to the interception of secret
documents and the U.S. government’s alleged readiness to surrender Quemoy and Matsu did
not appear in Suslov’s initial draft. It was added during the revisions shortly before the plenum.
42. Ibid., l. 80.
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the USSR and other socialist countries. And indeed, our Communist parties, too,
always emphasize that the socialist camp has only one foreign policy course.”43
Suslov declared that the Soviet Union would try to restore “complete unity” by
continuing “to express our candid opinions about the most important questions
affecting our common interests when our views do not coincide.” Although the aim
would be to bring China back into line with the USSR, Suslov argued that if these
efforts failed, the CPSU Presidium would “stick by the positions that our party
believes are correct.”
Throughout the report, Suslov insisted that the disagreements were not yet
irreparable. He noted several measures that could rapidly improve Sino-Soviet ties,
and he pledged that the CPSU Presidium would do all it could to “strengthen and
develop Soviet-Chinese friendship and unity” on the basis of “Leninist principles
of equality and mutual cooperation.” Nevertheless, a key passage in his report may
have left some Central Committee members wondering whether relations with
China could really be mended, at least while Mao Zedong remained in power:
“It has to be said that all the mistakes and shortcomings in the internal and
foreign policies of the Chinese Communist Party can be explained in large part
by the cult of personality surrounding Cde. Mao Zedong. Formally, the CC of
the Chinese Communist Party abides by the norms of collective leadership, but
in reality the most important decisions are made by one man and therefore are
often plagued by subjectivism and, in some instances, are simply ill-conceived.
By all appearances, the glorification of Mao Zedong in China has been growing
inexorably. More and more often, statements appear in the party press that ‘we
Chinese live in the great era of Mao Zedong.’ Comrade Mao Zedong is depicted
as a great leader and a genius. They call him the beacon, who is shining the way
to Communism and is the embodiment of the ideas of Communism. The name of
Mao Zedong is equated with the party, and vice versa. The works of Cde. Mao
Zedong are presented in China as the final word of creative Marxism and are
placed on a par with the classic works of Marxism-Leninism. [...] All of this,
unfortunately, impresses Cde. Mao Zedong, who, judging from everything, is
himself convinced of his own infallibility. This is reminiscent of the situation
that existed in our country during the final years of I. V. Stalin. We, of course,
weren’t able to speak with the Chinese comrades about this, but the [CPSU]
Plenum must be aware of these aspects of life in the Chinese Communist
Party.”44
This part of Suslov’s report went well beyond any previous statements that Soviet
leaders had made in forums larger than the CPSU Presidium. Up to this point,
Soviet officials had said nothing in public about the problems with China, and even
in private Moscow’s criticism of Mao had been subdued. Despite Suslov’s
willingness to voice much stronger complaints at the Central Committee plenum,
he indicated that a low-key policy should be maintained in public. Although he
43. Ibid., l. 81.
44. Ibid., ll. 88-89.
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acknowledged that the Soviet Union would not praise or overlook what it believed
to be “profound mistakes,” he averred that “we shouldn’t engage in direct criticism,
since this would lead to an unnecessary public discussion which might be construed
as interference in the internal affairs of the Chinese Communist Party and would
induce our enemies to gloat over the discord between the CPSU and the Chinese
Communist Party.” Suslov argued that, at least for the time being, the CPSU must
“avoid public discussions and rely instead on private meetings and other contacts
between the two parties to explain our position to the Chinese comrades.”
Despite Suslov’s hopes that the situation could be rectified and that public
polemics could be avoided, the Sino-Soviet split continued to widen. Tensions
increased rapidly in the first few months of 1960, culminating in the publication of
a lengthy statement by Chinese leaders in April 1960 during celebrations of the
90th anniversary of Lenin’s birthday.45 The statement, entitled “Long live
Leninism,” removed any doubts that Soviet officials and diplomats still had about
the magnitude of the rift between the two countries.46 Soon thereafter, in early June
1960, all the East European governments became aware of the conflict when
Chinese officials voiced strong criticism of the Soviet Union at a meeting in Beijing
of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). The dispute escalated a few
weeks later at the Third Congress of the Romanian Communist Party in Bucharest,
where Khrushchev sought to rebut the comments expressed at the WFTU meeting
and to retaliate for China’s decision to provide other delegates with copies of a
confidential letter that Khrushchev had sent to the CCP leadership. The top Chinese
official in Bucharest, Peng Zhen, responded in kind.47
This confrontation was the main topic of discussion at the next CPSU Central
Committee plenum, on 14-16 July 1960. Khrushchev designated one of his closest
aides on the Presidium, Frol Kozlov, to present a lengthy report to the plenum
outlining “the mistaken positions of the CCP CC on fundamental questions of
Marxist-Leninist theory and current international relations.”48 Kozlov reiterated all
the complaints voiced by Suslov seven months earlier, but the tone of his speech
was much more pessimistic. Kozlov accused the Chinese leadership of “acting
surreptitiously, behind the backs of the CPSU and the other fraternal parties, to
create fissures and rifts in the international Communist movement and to spread its
45. “Long live Leninism!” was first published in Hongqi [Beijing], 8 (16 April 1960), and then
republished in translation in Peking Review, 3, 17 (April 1960): 14-22.
46. See, for example, the interview with the former head of the Soviet “missile group” in China,
General Aleksandr Savel’ev, in Aleksandr Dolinin, “Kak nashi raketchiki kitaitsev obuchali,”
Krasnaia zvezda, (May 13, 1995): 6.
47. For a lively account of the Bucharest session, which includes details omitted from the
official transcript, see Edward Crankshaw, The new Cold War: Moscow v. Peking (Baltimore:
Penguin, 1963): 97-110.
48. “Doklad na Plenume TsK KPSS ob itogakh Soveshchaniia predstavitelei bratskikh partii v
Bukhareste i ob oshibochnykh pozitsiiakh rukovodstva TsK KPK po nekotorym
printsipial’nym voprosam marksistsko-leninskoi teorii i sovremennykh mezhdunarodnykh
otnoshenii,” 13 July 1960 (Strictly Secret), TsKhSD, f. 2, op. 1, d. 472, ll. 2-74.
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own special views, [which] contravene sacred Leninist principles.” His speech
prefigured the harsh rhetoric that would soon pervade Sino-Soviet exchanges.
At the next CPSU Central Committee plenum, on 10-18 January 1961, the
growing acrimony in the world Communist movement was again the main topic of
discussion. By this point, the Soviet Union had withdrawn all its military
technicians and advisers from China, and had begun recalling its thousands of non-
military personnel, causing disarray in many of China’s largest economic and
technical projects and scientific research programs.49 At the plenum, Suslov
presented a lengthy and — on the surface — surprisingly upbeat assessment of the
“world conference” of 81 Communist parties in Moscow in November 1960. He
claimed that the meeting had “successfully resolved all these problems [of disunity
in the Communist world] and had marked a new, spectacular triumph of Marxism-
Leninism in the international Communist movement.”50 The Soviet Union, he
declared, could now “tirelessly work to strengthen the unity, cohesion, and
friendship” among socialist countries.
Despite this optimistic gloss, much of Suslov’s speech at the plenum actually
gave grounds for deep pessimism. Although Soviet and Chinese officials had been
able to achieve a last-minute compromise that temporarily papered over their
differences, this fragile “solution” had been preceded by venomous exchanges.
Suslov acknowledged that, from the outset of the conference, “the Chinese
Communist leaders not only had declined to reassess their mistaken views, but had
grown even more adamant in espousing anti-Leninist and anti-Marxist” policies.
Suslov maintained that the CPSU Presidium had “done its best to overcome its
disagreements with the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party” through a
series of preliminary meetings and contacts, but had failed to persuade the Chinese
delegates to alter “their mistaken views on crucial matters.”51 All the preparatory
work for the conference, according to Suslov, had been turned by the Chinese into
“a source of discord.” The proceedings of the conference itself had not been made
public, but Suslov informed the Central Committee that the head of the Chinese
delegation, Deng Xiaoping, had delivered two speeches that were sharply at odds
with the CPSU’s positions, demonstrating “a complete unwillingness to find some
way of overcoming the two parties’ disagreements.” Suslov also noted that the
Albanian delegation, led by Enver Hoxha, had sided with the Chinese participants
and had expressed “bizarre, malevolent, and dogmatic views aimed solely at
causing tension and dividing the conference.”52 Although Soviet leaders had been
49. For a useful account of this process by a participant, see Mikhail A. Klochko, Soviet
scientist in Red China (Montreal: International Publishers Representatives, 1964), esp.: 164-
188. See also A. Dolinin, art. cit.: 6.
50. “Ob itogakh Soveshchaniia predstavitelei kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partii,” in
“Materialy k Protokolu No. 18 zasedaniia Plenuma TsK KPSS, 10-18 ianvaria 1961 g.,”
January 1961 (Strictly Secret), TsKhSD, f. 2, op. 1, d. 495, ll. 11-85. The quoted passage is on
l. 12.
51. Ibid., l. 33.
52. Ibid., ll. 55-57.
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aware since mid-1960 that Albania was aligning itself with China, Hoxha’s speech
at the November 1960 conference, according to Suslov, had shown for the first time
what a “monstrous” form this realignment was taking.
The speeches of the Chinese and Albanian delegations, Suslov told the Central
Committee, had been greeted by a torrent of angry criticism. “Everyone at the
conference,” he claimed, “understood that the Chinese delegation’s opposition to
certain points,” especially to a proposed statement regarding the need to overcome
the “pernicious consequences of [Stalin’s] personality cult,” was motivated by “an
awareness that this statement could be directed against all forms of personality
cults, including the one in the Chinese Communist Party.”53 Suslov argued that the
“mistaken views of the Chinese comrades” would persist so long as Mao Zedong
demanded “endless glorification” and “aspired to claim a special role in the
development of Marxist-Leninist theory” and the policies of the socialist bloc:
“With the obvious guidance of the CCP leadership, the Chinese press is fanning
the personality cult of Cde. Mao Zedong and proclaiming him ‘the greatest
Marxist-Leninist of our time’ (Renmin Ribao, 7 October 1960), in the hope of
staking out a special role for Mao Zedong in the international Communist
movement. It is hardly accidental that CCP leaders have geared their actions
over the past year toward the assumption of a dominant place among the
fraternal Communist parties.”54
Suslov acknowledged to the Central Committee that the impasse resulting from the
“obduracy” of the Chinese leadership had nearly caused the meeting to collapse.
Although Khrushchev was able to reach a compromise with the Chinese delegation
in last-ditch talks on 30 November, the bulk of the conference had given little
reason to believe that the dispute was genuinely resolved. Suslov tried to put the
best face on the whole matter — claiming that “our party achieved a great moral-
political victory from the conference” and that “one of the most important results of
the Moscow Conference was the resumption of close contacts between the CPSU
CC and the Chinese Communist Party CC” — but his lengthy account of the
conference belied his expressed hope that “there is now a solid basis for the
strengthening of Soviet-Chinese friendship and the unity of our parties.”55
The precariousness of the outcome in November 1960 became evident soon
after the January 1961 plenum, as the polemics and recriminations resumed behind
the scenes with ever greater stridency. Before long, the dispute flared into the open,
and news of the Sino-Soviet conflict spread throughout the world. Khrushchev and
Mao made a few additional attempts to reconcile their countries’ differences, but
the rift, if anything, grew even wider. Hopes of restoring a semblance of unity in the
international Communist movement were dashed. At CPSU Central Committee
plenums from late 1962 on, Soviet leaders no longer held out any hope that the split
53. Ibid., l. 45
54. Ibid., ll. 65-66.
55. Ibid., ll. 78, 87.
DECLASSIFIED MATERIALS FROM CPSU CC PLENUMS 293
could be surmounted. Instead, they used the plenums to marshal broad support
within the party for what was projected to be a long and dangerous struggle against
China.
A typical session occurred in December 1963 when Khrushchev, Suslov, and a
number of other CPSU Secretaries — Boris Ponomarev, the head of the CPSU CC
International Department, Iurii Andropov, the head of the CPSU CC department for
intra-bloc relations, and Leonid Il’ichev, the head of the CPSU CC Ideology
Department — spoke at length about the “disagreements connected with the
willfully divisive actions of the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.”56
Coming after a year of acrimonious polemics between the Soviet Union and China,
the December 1963 plenum featured endless condemnations of “the CCP
leadership’s resort to open polemics and other actions that, in both form and
method, are unacceptable in relations between Marxist-Leninists.” The speakers at
the plenum claimed that “the CCP leaders are now increasingly trying to carry their
profoundly mistaken views on ideological matters into interstate relations [so that]
they can destroy the friendship and cohesion of the Communist movement and
weaken the anti-imperialist front.” To ensure that CPSU members at all levels
would be prepared for a confrontation with China, the CPSU Secretariat decided on
16 December 1963 to expand the distribution list for the major speeches given at
the plenum.57
One of the consistent themes about Sino-Soviet relations at the Central
Committee plenums in 1963, 1964, and 1965 was the effort China had been making
to lure other Communist states and parties to its camp, building on its success with
Albania. As early as the January 1961 plenum, Suslov reported that China had done
its best at the November 1960 conference to line up broad support for its “mistaken
and divisive” positions:
“I have to acknowledge that there was a small group of waverers. In addition to
the Albanians, the Burmese and Malayan representatives usually followed the
lead of the Chinese comrades. The reasons for this are clear: namely, that they
lived and worked for a long time in Beijing. Besides the Burmese and Malayans,
the delegates from the Vietnamese Workers’ Party and the Communist parties of
Indonesia, Japan, and Australia also showed signs of wavering. These parties are
from countries that are geographically close to the PRC, and they have
close traditional ties with the CCP. Unusual pressure was applied on their
representatives [by the Chinese].”58
56. See the marked-up versions of the presentations in “Materialy k Protokolu No. 6 zasedaniia
Plenuma TsK KPSS, 13 dekabria 1963 g.: O deiatel’nosti Prezidiuma TsK KPSS po
ukrepleniiu edinstva kommunisticheskogo dvizheniia, postanovlenie Sekretariata TsK KPSS
ob izdanii tekstov vystuplenii na Plenume TsK Ponomareva B. N., Andropova Iu. V., i
Il’icheva L. F., rechi sekretarei TsK KPSS Ponomareva, Andropova, Il’icheva, i Khrushcheva
N.S.,” 9-13 December 1963 (Strictly Secret), TsKhSD, f. 2, op. 1, d. 665.
57. “Vypiska iz protokola No. 90/257gs zasedaniia Sekretariata TsK ot 16.XII.1963 g.,”
16 December 1963 (Top Secret), TsKhSD, f. 2, op. 1, d. 693, l. 4.
58. “Ob itogakh Soveshchaniia predstavitelei kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partii,” (see
Note 50 supra), ll. 61-62.
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Over the next few years, Soviet concerns about the fissiparous effects of the Sino-
Soviet split greatly increased. At the Central Committee plenum in December
1963, Iurii Andropov, the head of the CPSU CC department for intra-bloc relations,
claimed that China had been secretly attempting to induce other East European
countries to follow Albania’s lead. He noted that the Chinese had been focusing
their efforts on Poland, Hungary, and East Germany:
“The Chinese leaders are carrying out a policy of crude sabotage in relation to
Poland, Hungary, and the GDR. Characteristic of this is the fact that in
September of this year, during conversations with a Hungarian official in China,
Politbiuro member Chu De declared that China would welcome it if the
Hungarian comrades diverged from the CPSU’s line. But, Chu De threatened, if
you remain on the side of the revisionists, we will have to take a stance against
you.”59
Beijing’s contacts with these three countries bore little fruit in the end, but Soviet
leaders obviously could not be sure of that at the time. The mere likelihood that
China was seeking to foment discord within the Soviet bloc was enough to spark
heightened vigilance in Moscow.
Soviet concerns increased still further over the next several months when
another Warsaw Pact country, Romania, began seeking a neutral position in the
Sino-Soviet dispute. Although the Romanians never went as far as the Albanians in
pursuing outright alignment with China, the Romanian leader Nicolae Ceausescu
refused to endorse Moscow’s polemics or to join in other steps aimed at isolating
Beijing. This policy had been foreshadowed as early as February 1964, when
Suslov warned the CPSU Central Committee that China was redoubling its efforts
to split the Soviet bloc:
“These efforts by the CCP leaders, far from being limited to the ideological
sphere, extend into the sphere of practical politics among socialist countries
and Communist parties. In seeking to enervate the unity and cohesion of the
socialist commonwealth, the CCP leadership resorts to all manner of tricks and
maneuvers to disrupt economic and political relations among the socialist
countries and to sow discord in their activities on the international arena.
Recently, the fissiparous and subversive actions of the Chinese leaders in the
world Communist movement have drastically increased. There is no longer
any doubt that Beijing is seeking to provoke a schism among the Communist
parties and the creation of factions and groups that are hostile to Marxism-
Leninism.”60
59. “Rech’ Sekretaria TsK KPSS tov. Andropova Iu. V. na dekabrskom (1963 g.) Plenuma TsK
KPSS,” No. P2002, (Top Secret), 9-13 December 1963, TsKhSD, f. 2, op. 1, d. 665, l. 30.
60. “Bor’ba KPSS za splochennost’ mirovogo kommunisticheskogo dvizheniia: Doklad
tovarishcha M. A. Suslova na Plenume TsK KPSS 14 fevralia 1964 goda,” P. 480, TsKhSD,
f. 2, op. 1, d. 731, l. 158ob.
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Suslov’s warning seemed even more pertinent a year later, when Romania’s
defiance had become more overt. In April 1964 the Romanian government issued a
stinging rejection of Khrushchev’s scheme for supranational economic integration
within the socialist bloc (a scheme that would have relegated Romania to being
little more than a supplier of agricultural goods and raw materials for the more
industrialized Communist countries).61 From then on, the Romanian authorities
began reorienting their foreign trade away from the Soviet Union. By 1965,
Romania’s divergence from the basic foreign policy line of the Warsaw Pact
countries was extending well beyond foreign economic matters. In March 1965,
Ceausescu declined to take part in a Consultative Meeting of Communist and
Workers’ Parties in Moscow, which was designed to lay the groundwork for
another world conference of Communist parties, following up on the November
1960 session. Romania’s refusal to attend was based, at least in part, on China’s
boycott of the meeting. Soviet leaders had assured Ceausescu and the Chinese
authorities that, in the wake of Khrushchev’s ouster in October 1964, there was an
opportunity to search for “new approaches and new means of achieving unity in the
world Communist movement,” but neither the Chinese nor Ceausescu agreed to
take up the offer. Romania’s absence from the meeting was conspicuous as the only
ruling Communist party other than China and Albania that failed to show up.
(Officials from Cuba, North Vietnam, Mongolia, and North Korea all attended, as
did representatives of several non-ruling Communist parties.)
At a CPSU Central Committee plenum on 24-26 March 1965, Suslov praised the
consultative meeting, but noted regretfully that Romania had not taken part. He
then accused the Chinese of trying to foment discord within the Warsaw Pact:
“The leadership of the CCP not only is directly supporting factional groups in
the fraternal countries, but is also saying that ‘in the future this sort of work must
be greatly stepped up.’ The Chinese leaders declare that their disagreements
with the CPSU and the other parties are ‘disagreements between two hostile
classes, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie,’ and hence they reject any attempts
to improve relations between our parties.”62
The tone of Suslov’s presentation at this plenum was far more somber than his
earlier reports. He even warned of Chinese efforts to stir up unrest in the Soviet
Union itself, alluding to a student demonstration that Chinese officials had
orchestrated in Moscow in early March 1965 to try, as Suslov put it, to “incite an
anti-Soviet hysteria.”63 No longer did he hold out any hope that relations with
China could be ameliorated. Although Suslov affirmed that “the CPSU Presidium
believes it necessary to move ahead patiently, without giving in to provocations,
61. Romanian Press Agency, Statement on the stand of the Romanian Workers’ Party
concerning problems of the world Communist and working class movement (Bucharest:
Agerpres, 1964).
62. “Soobshchenie ob itogakh Konsul’tativnoi vstrechi kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh
partii,” TsKhSD, f. 2, op. 1, d. 766, ll. 98-99.
63. Ibid., ll. 105-106.
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[...] to show the Chinese people our sincere desire to live with them in friendship,”
he acknowledged that “the Chinese leadership has completely rejected all the
positive suggestions in the communiqué from the Consultative Meeting.”
The increasingly harsh tone of the speeches given by Suslov and other Soviet
leaders at Central Committee plenums provides a valuable way to track the
deterioration of Soviet ties with China. After having sought, at the December 1959
plenum, to caution against public denunciations of China, Suslov over time had to
embrace the hostile rhetoric that characterized Sino-Soviet relations. This trend
corresponded with the shift in bilateral ties from the amity of the mid-1950s to the
tensions in the late 1950s to the bitter dispute of the early and mid-1960s. Once the
conflict was fully under way, the pronouncements by Suslov and others at the plenums
were intended not only to warn about real dangers from China, but also to reassure the
Central Committee that the top leaders would not compromise Soviet interests.
The Zhukov affair
Normally, the Central Committee was not involved in military policy. That sphere
of activity was left to the CPSU Presidium/Politbiuro, the Defense Council, the
Ministry of Defense, and the CPSU CC Administrative Organs Department.
Military issues were not brought before the Central Committee even for nominal
approval. A partial exception came in late October 1957, when Khrushchev
decided to oust Soviet defense minister Marshal Georgii Zhukov from all his senior
party and ministerial positions. Khrushchev took this step to consolidate his own
power, but the affair inevitably had some bearing on civil-military relations.
Although it did not represent an institutional clash between civilian and military
authorities (and clearly was not motivated by fears that Zhukov would try to seize
power in a coup d’état), it reinforced the norm of the army’s subordination to
civilian (i.e., Communist Party) control.64
The declassification of the October 1957 plenum materials, amounting to
several thousand pages, does not fully dispel the mystery that has long surrounded
the Zhukov affair. Just four months earlier, in June 1957, Zhukov had sided with
Khrushchev against the “Anti-Party Group” and had been rewarded for his efforts
by being promoted to full membership on the CPSU Presidium. Khrushchev’s
abrupt shift against Zhukov in October 1957 came as a shock both inside and
outside the Soviet Union. The decisive maneuvers to remove Zhukov occurred
while the defense minister was on an extended trip to Yugoslavia and Albania in the
last few weeks of October, a trip that had been authorized by the CPSU Presidium.
When Zhukov began his travels he had no inkling that he was about to be
dismissed, as he acknowledged at the plenum:
64. For an excellent analysis of the Zhukov affair written long before the archives were opened,
see Timothy J. Colton, Commissars, commanders, and civilian authority: The structure of
Soviet military politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979): 175-195. Colton’s
account holds up very well in the light of the new evidence.
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“Some three weeks ago, when I was instructed to set off for Yugoslavia and
Albania, I said goodbye to all the members of the CC [Presidium], or at least to
most of them, and we spoke as though we were the closest of friends. No one
said a word to me about any problem. [...] I was not given the slightest hint that
my behavior was somehow deemed improper. Only now are they saying this to
me. [...] We all parted in such good spirits and warm friendship three weeks ago
that it’s still hard to believe all this has suddenly happened.”65
In a remarkably short period of time after Zhukov’s departure, Khrushchev
arranged with the other Presidium members (and with senior military officers) to
deprive the defense minister of all his top posts. The CPSU Presidium formally
endorsed the ouster of Zhukov and the appointment of a successor, Marshal Rodion
Malinovskii, at a meeting on 26 October, which Zhukov was hastily summoned to
attend while he was still in Albania. The announcement of his dismissal and the
appointment of Malinovskii as defense minister was carried by the TASS news
agency later that day. Only after Zhukov’s fate was sealed did Khrushchev convene
the Central Committee.
Because the notes from Khrushchev’s earlier discussions and from the relevant
Presidium meetings (especially the meetings on 19 and 26 October) have not yet
been released, key information about Khrushchev’s motives in the affair is still
unavailable.66 The plenum documents show only what Khrushchev wanted the
Central Committee to hear, not necessarily what he really believed. Nevertheless,
the plenum materials do add some intriguing details to previous accounts and, if
used circumspectly, shed considerable light on the reasons for Khrushchev’s move
against his erstwhile ally.
One of the most valuable aspects of the declassified documents, repetitive and
turgid though they may be, is that they clarify the allegations against Zhukov. The
general case against Zhukov had been known since a few days after the plenum,
when summary materials were published in the CPSU daily Pravda.67 Official
histories of the Soviet Army’s political organs, published in 1964 and 1968, had
provided some additional information.68 Even so, a few of the allegations were at
best unclear, and in some cases it was not known precisely what Zhukov had been
65. “Plenum TsK KPSS, 28-29 oktiabria 1957 g., XX Sozyv: Stenogramma vtorogo
zasedaniia,” 27-29 October 1957 (Strictly Secret), TsKhSD, f. 2, op. 1, d. 266, l. 57.
66. One item that has been released in the materials gathered for the plenum, a letter from the
Soviet minister of culture, Nikolai Mikhailov, to the CPSU Presidium, indicates that Zhukov’s
ouster was assured as of 25 October, the day before the CPSU Presidium formally approved the
measure. See “V Prezidium TsK KPSS,” 25 October 1957 (Secret), from N. Mikhailov,
TsKhSD, f. 2, op. 1, d. 261, ll. 45-51. No doubt, other documents, not yet released, will shed
greater light on the timing and motives of Khrushchev’s actions.
67. “Informatsionnoe soobshchenie o Plenume Tsentral’nogo Komiteta KPSS” and
“Postanovlenie Plenuma TsK KPSS ob uluchshenii partiino-politicheskoi raboty v Sovetskoi
Armii I Flote,” Pravda, (November 3, 1957): 1-3.
68. Iu. P. Petrov, Partiinoe stroitel’stvo v Sovetskoi Armii i Flote (1918-1961) (Moscow:
Voenizdat, 1964): 460-462; and Iu. P. Petrov, Stroitel’stvo politorganov, partiinykh i
komsomol’skikh organizatsii Armii i Flota (1918-1968) (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1968): 434-439.
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accused of. Nor was it known whether Zhukov had tried to defend himself against
the charges. The vast quantity of declassified testimony and supporting
documentation introduced at the plenum, beginning with Suslov’s opening speech
(which outlined all of Zhukov’s alleged transgressions), gives a much better sense
of what the charges entailed.
For example, it had long been known that Zhukov was denounced for having
proposed certain changes in high-level military organs, but it was not known
precisely what his alleged intentions were. The plenum materials indicate that
Zhukov was accused of having wanted to abolish the Higher Military Council, a
body consisting of all the members and candidate members of the CPSU Presidium
as well as all the commanders of military districts, groups of forces, and naval
fleets. The Higher Military Council was under the direct jurisdiction of the Defense
Council, the supreme command organ in the USSR, whose existence had not yet
been publicly disclosed. According to Suslov’s speech at the plenum, Zhukov had
refrained from convening the Higher Military Council and had then proposed to
disband it. The CPSU Presidium, Suslov added, “rejected the defense minister’s
unwise proposal.”69
The plenum materials also clarify what Zhukov allegedly wanted to do with the
extensive system of Military Councils. Each military district, group of forces, and
naval fleet had its own Military Council, which consisted of regional party
secretaries as well as senior commanders and political officers from the local
military units. The Military Council was responsible for “upholding the constant
combat and mobilization readiness of troops, the high quality of combat and
political training, and the strictness of military discipline.”70 According to Suslov,
Zhukov wanted to “transform the Military Councils into informal consultative
organs under the [military] commanders,” a step that supposedly would have
relegated the Communist party to a subordinate role in military affairs:
“It didn’t bother Cde. Zhukov that the members of the Military Councils in the
[military] districts include secretaries of the party’s oblast’ and territorial
committees and secretaries of the Central Committees of the union-republic
Communist parties. It was perfectly fine with him that the secretaries of oblast’
committees, territorial committees, and Communist party CCs would be placed
‘under the commanders and not given an equal voice’ in the Military Councils.”71
Suslov emphasized that “the existence of full-fledged Military Councils in no way
detracts from the dignity and role of [military] commanders. On the contrary, the
69. “Doklad tov. Suslova M. A.: Ob uluchshenii partiino-politicheskoi raboty v Sovetskoi
Armii i Flote,” 28 October 1957 (Strictly Secret), in “Plenum TsK KPSS 28-29 oktiabria 1957
g., XX Sozyv: Stenogramma pervogo zasedaniia (utrennego),” 27-29 October 1957 (Strictly
Secret), TsKhSD, f. 2, op. 1, d. 266, l. 14 (hereafter: “Doklad tov. Suslova M. A.”).
70. Marshal S. F. Akhromeev, et al., eds., Voennyi entsiklopedicheskii slovar’, 2nd ed.
(Moscow: Voenizdat, 1986): 146.
71. “Doklad tov. Suslova M. A.,” ll. 15-16.
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Military Councils allow the commanders to be certain that the decisions they make
are appropriate.”72 Only a “petty tyrant,” Suslov added, would have tried to scale
back the Military Councils.
Another allegation discussed at great length at the plenum was Zhukov’s
supposed desire to establish a “cult of personality” around himself. One of the main
things cited as evidence for this accusation was the efforts that Zhukov allegedly
made to highlight the depiction of his own feats in the film “Velikaia bitva” (“The
Great Battle”), a documentary about the Battle of Stalingrad. The film had been
commissioned in October 1953 to replace the 1943 film “Stalingrad,” which was
deemed to give undue prominence to Stalin’s role in the campaign. The new
documentary was completed in early 1957 but was then subject to a number of
revisions. At the CPSU Presidium meeting on 26 October, Zhukov insisted that he
had not been involved in the production of “Velikaia bitva,” but Suslov argued at the
plenum that Zhukov’s denials “do not correspond to reality.”73 Relying on a letter
from the Soviet minister of culture, Nikolai Mikhailov, which was drafted at
Khrushchev’s request after the decision to remove Zhukov had been made, Suslov
claimed that the defense minister had “directly and actively intervened in the film-
making” numerous times to “propagandize [his own] cult of personality.”74 Suslov
cited a few other items as well — notably, the preparation of an article about World
War II for the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, and the majestic depiction of Zhukov in a
painting in the Soviet Army Museum — to bolster his claim that “Zhukov was deeply
concerned to aggrandize his persona and his prestige, without regard for the interests
of the [Communist] Party.” Having waged “a struggle against the well-known abuses
resulting from I. V. Stalin’s cult of personality,” Suslov declared, “our Party must
never again permit anyone to build up a cult of personality in any form whatsoever.”75
Perhaps the most serious allegation put forth by Suslov and Khrushchev was that
Zhukov had been trying to “take control of the army away from the party and to
establish a one-man dictatorship in the armed forces.”76 Khrushchev argued that there
was supposed to be “a division of responsibilities among [senior] members of the
party,” and that no single official, not even the CPSU First Secretary (much less the
defense minister), could “take on all the functions of the Central Committee.”77 He
condemned Zhukov for allegedly having sought to “place everything, the Committee
on State Security as well as the Ministry of Internal Affairs, under the Ministry of
72. Ibid., l. 16.
73. Ibid., l. 21.
74. Ibid. For the letter from Mikhailov, see “V Prezidium TsK KPSS,” as cited in Note 66
supra. When evaluating Mikhailov’s letter, it is important to bear in mind that the letter was not
written spontaneously. Mikhailov had been instructed by Khrushchev to write such a letter, and
his detailed assertions must be judged accordingly.
75. “Doklad tov. Suslova M. A.,” ll. 4, 17-18.
76. “Materialy k Protokolu No. 5 zasedaniia Plenuma TsK KPSS 28-29. 10. 1957 g.,” TsKhSD,
f. 2, op. 1, d. 261, l. 72.
77. “Rech’ tov. N. S. Khrushcheva,” ll. 60-61. This passage in the verbatim transcript was
deleted from the stenographic account.
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Defense.” Khrushchev added that if the situation had continued this way “for another
month or so,” Zhukov would have been insisting that “the Central Committee, too,
must be brought under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense.”78
Khrushchev produced no concrete evidence to substantiate these claims, but
both he and Suslov specifically accused Zhukov of having sought to establish
military jurisdiction over the main security organs:
“Cde. Zhukov recently proposed that the chairman of the Committee on State
Security and the Minister of Internal Affairs be replaced by military officers.
What lay behind this suggestion? Wasn’t it an attempt to fill the leading posts in
these organs with his own people, with cadres who would be personally
beholden to him? Isn’t he seeking to establish his own control over the
Committee on State Security and the Ministry of Internal Affairs?”79
Newly available evidence suggests that this charge was disingenuous, or at least
highly misleading. The KGB’s own top-secret history of its activities and
organization, compiled in 1977, makes no mention of any such effort by Zhukov.
On the contrary, the KGB textbook emphasizes that in the mid- and late 1950s “the
CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government” themselves sought to “fill
the ranks of the state security organs with experienced party and military
personnel” in order to “eliminate the consequences of the hostile activity of Beria
and his accomplices.”80 To the extent that military officers were brought into the
KGB and MVD after 1953, this trend was initiated and encouraged by the top
political leadership. (Khrushchev and his colleagues, after all, had learned at the
time of Beria’s arrest that they could count on Zhukov and other senior military
officers to support the CPSU.)
The spuriousness of this particular accusation reflected a more general pattern. As
valuable as the plenum materials are in spelling out the case against Zhukov, the main
conclusion one can draw from the documents is that the affair was little more than a
personal clash between Khrushchev and Zhukov. Despite the sinister veneer that
Khrushchev gave (both at the plenum and later on in his memoirs) to Zhukov’s
actions, the documents leave no doubt that the charges against Zhukov were largely
contrived. Zhukov was justified in pointing this out during his first speech at the
plenum: “I think we have gathered here not to review individual offenses. [...] That’s
not what this is all about. In the end, the question here is political, not juridical.”81
78. Ibid., l. 61.
79. “Doklad tov. Suslova M. A.,” l. 21.
80. Lieut.-General V. M. Chebrikov et al., eds, Istoriia sovetskikh organov gosudarstvennoi
bezopasnosti, No. 12179, Top Secret (Moscow: Vysshaia Krasnoznamennaia Shkola Komiteta
Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti, 1977): 532 (emphasis added). This lengthy textbook is still
classified in Moscow, but a copy was unearthed in Riga by the Latvian scholar, Indulis Zalite,
who is now head of the Center for Documentation of the Consequences of Totalitarianism, a
leading research institute in Riga. He generously allowed me to photocopy it and many other
Soviet KGB documents that are currently inaccessible in Moscow.
81. “Plenum TsK KPSS, oktiabr’ 1957 goda: Stenogramma tret’ego zasedaniia (utrennego),”
TsKhSD, f. 2, op. 1, d. 266, l. 60.
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Khrushchev’s motive in convening the Central Committee was similar to his
(and others’) motives in orchestrating the July 1953 plenum to denounce Beria.
Rather than acknowledge that the ouster of Zhukov was the latest stage in a
consolidation of power, Khrushchev used the October 1957 plenum to suggest that
the defense minister had been removed because of genuine concerns about the
Communist Party’s supervision of the army.
It is true, of course, that numerous problems existed in the Soviet armed forces
in 1957, and that the military’s political organs were not functioning as well as most
officials had hoped. It is also true that Zhukov wanted to enforce stricter discipline
in the army by establishing a more orderly chain of command and by mitigating the
opportunities for insubordination. And it is true that Zhukov tended to be impatient
and abrasive with his colleagues and subordinates (both fellow soldiers and party
officials), and that he went along with efforts to play up his own role in World War
II. Nevertheless, these deficiencies hardly amounted to a broad indictment of
Zhukov’s tenure as defense minister. The activities that Suslov claimed were an
attempt by Zhukov to establish a “cult of personality” were not at all unusual in the
context of Soviet politics. The routine glorification of Khrushchev in the late 1950s
far exceeded anything that Zhukov may have been promoting for himself.
Similarly, most of the other problems that were highlighted at the plenum, both in
the armed forces as a whole and in the political organs, had long existed. Zhukov
may have marginally worsened a few of these problems, but he also seems to have
rectified certain key deficiencies, notably by boosting morale and increasing the
combat readiness of frontline units. During the one major operation that Zhukov
oversaw as defense minister, the large-scale intervention in Hungary in November
1956, Soviet troops accomplished their mission within a few days despite
encountering vigorous armed resistance from Hungarian insurgents.
The flimsiness of the allegations against Zhukov undoubtedly accounts for
Khrushchev’s decision to raise questions about Zhukov’s military abilities and
accomplishments. Although Khrushchev and Suslov both claimed that they “deeply
value Cde. Zhukov’s performance during the Great Patriotic War,” they also wanted
to ensure that Zhukov’s legendary reputation and stature would not cause members of
the Central Committee to be hesitant about criticizing him. To this end, Khrushchev
downplayed Zhukov’s role in World War II by arguing that Vasilii Chuikov, not
Zhukov, was the “chief hero” of the Stalingrad campaign. Khrushchev also rebuked
Zhukov for dwelling solely on the positive aspects of his military career:
“Cde. Zhukov, I don’t want to disparage your military accomplishments, but
you should think about it a bit. You had both your successes and your failures,
just as all the other generals and marshals did. Why do you insist on talking only
about the successes and victories, and completely glossing over the failures?”82
82. “Rech’ tov. N. S. Khrushcheva,” l. 45.
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Amplifying on this point later on, Khrushchev declared that “our [other] generals
and marshals know at least as much as Zhukov does, and perhaps much more, about
military organization and the other military sciences. Cde. Zhukov has only a poor
understanding of the latest technology.”83
In addition to expressing doubts about Zhukov’s military prowess, Khrushchev
alleged that Zhukov had advocated certain foreign policy steps that “bordered on
treason.” In particular, Khrushchev claimed that Zhukov “wrote a memorandum to
the party’s Central Committee recommending that we accept [the U.S.
government’s] ‘Open Skies’ proposal,” which would have entitled the United
States and the Soviet Union to fly reconnaissance flights over one another’s
territory to monitor compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements. Khrushchev
averred that the other members of the Presidium were startled to learn that “the
defense minister, of all people, could have favored such a thing,” and they “reacted
with heated protests against Zhukov’s proposal.”84 Khrushchev’s efforts to impugn
Zhukov’s “adventurist” positions on “the most important foreign policy issues
facing the Soviet Union” (in the phrasing of the plenum resolution) were not
altogether different from the attempts in July 1953 to portray Beria’s alleged views
about Germany in the most unsavory light possible.
Despite the many similarities between the October 1957 plenum and the July
1953 plenum, there was one fundamental difference. Unlike Beria, who was held in
prison during the July 1953 sessions and executed five months later, Zhukov was
given the opportunity to speak twice at the October 1957 plenum and to interject
comments from time to time during others’ remarks. His first speech came after the
main allegations against him had been laid out, and his second, much briefer (and
more contrite) statement came just before Khrushchev’s lengthy speech at the
fourth session of the plenum, on the evening of 29 October. On neither occasion did
Zhukov project an air of angry defiance or even take as firm a stand as Molotov did
in July 1955, but he defended his record at some length and rebutted the most lurid
accusations against him. Overall, he left no doubt that he strongly disagreed with
the grounds for his dismissal. At the same time, Zhukov had decided beforehand
that it would be best if he accepted responsibility for certain “mistakes” (whether
real or not) and indicated his willingness to comply with the party’s wishes:
“I request that you understand that [my] mistakes were not the result of any sort
of deviation from the line of the party, but were the sorts of mistakes that any
working official might make. I assure you, comrades (and I think I will receive
appropriate support in this regard), that with the help of our party I will be able,
with honor and dignity, to overcome the mistakes I have committed, and I
absolutely will be a worthy figure in our party. I was and always will be a
reliable member of the party.”85
83. Ibid., l. 65. This passage in the verbatim transcript was toned down in the final stenographic
account.
84. Ibid., ll. 58-59.
85. “Plenum TsK KPSS, 28-29 oktiabria 1957 g., XX Sozyv: Stenogramma vtorogo
zasedaniia,” 27-29 October 1957 (Strictly Secret), TsKhSD, f. 2, op. 1, d. 266, l. 76.
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Zhukov’s willingness to acknowledge unspecified shortcomings reinforced the long-
standing pattern of civil-military relations in the Soviet Union. If the most renowned
figure in the Soviet armed forces was willing to submit himself to the discipline of the
Communist Party, the norm of civilian supremacy was clearer than ever.
This is not to suggest, however, that the affair was in any way an institutional
clash between the party and the military. On the contrary, the declassified plenum
materials show, more strongly than ever, that the Zhukov affair was not a
confrontation between civilian officials and military commanders. During the
plenum, senior military officers went out of their way to emphasize that
Khrushchev “is not only First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, but is also
chairman of the Defense Council,” a position equivalent to commander-in-chief of
the Soviet armed forces.86 Although it is now clear that General A. S. Zheltov, the
chief political officer in the Soviet Army in 1957, was instrumental in pressing for
Zhukov’s ouster, a substantial number of career military officers were also behind
the move. (The plenum documents suggest that Zheltov resented Zhukov mainly
because Zheltov had been left off the Central Committee at the XX Party Congress
in 1956, an omission that Zheltov evidently blamed on Zhukov.87) Zheltov’s report
at the CPSU Presidium meeting on 19 October was a catalyst for the final actions to
remove Zhukov, but it is clear that the preliminary maneuvering had begun well
before then, with the involvement of senior military commanders. Khrushchev was
able to secure a political-military consensus on the need to dismiss Zhukov.
The lack of any civilian-military disagreements on this issue is well illustrated by
the plenum itself, where not a single military officer spoke in defense of Zhukov. The
norm of subordination to party control outweighed any inclination that senior
commanders might have had to speak even mildly in favor of the deposed minister.88
All of Zhukov’s military colleagues and subordinates joined with Khrushchev and
Suslov in denouncing Zhukov’s alleged efforts to foster a “cult of personality” and to
“take control of the army away from the party.” Zhukov’s successor, Malinovskii,
expressed regret that Zhukov had allowed problems in the military to become so
acute that the Central Committee was forced to step in to resolve matters:
“Comrades, we military officers are very glad that the Plenum of the Central
Committee is discussing the matter of strengthening party-political work in the
Soviet Army and Navy. On the other hand, it is regrettable that we, as military
officers and members of the party, have reached the point where the Central
Committee itself has been compelled to intervene in this matter.”89
86. “Plenum TsK KPSS, oktiabr’ 1957 goda, XX Sozyv: Stenogramma tret’ego zasedaniia
Plenuma TsK KPSS, 28-29.10.1957 g.,” TsKhSD, f. 2, op. 1, d. 268, l. 77.
87. See the comments to this effect in “Rech’ tov. N. S. Khrushcheva,” ll. 5-6.
88. Malinovskii, who had been a first deputy minister during Zhukov’s tenure, started his
remarks with a positive observation (saying that “he had no ill feelings toward Cde. Zhukov”
and had “always gotten along well” with him), but then offered a highly critical assessment.
“Plenum TsK KPSS, oktiabr’ 1957 goda, XX Sozyv: Stenogramma vtorogo zasedaniia
Plenuma TsK KPSS,” 28 October 1957 (Strictly Secret), TsKhSD, f. 2, op. 1, d. 267, ll. 63-64.
89. Ibid., l. 64.
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Even military officers who had benefited greatly during Zhukov’s tenure, such as
Fleet Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, who had been appointed commander-in-chief of
the Soviet navy in 1956, argued that Zhukov’s “leadership of the ministry has
created an extremely agonizing, oppressive, and distasteful situation, which is
totally at odds with party and Leninist principles of leadership.” Gorshkov insisted
that Zhukov “regards himself as absolutely infallible” and “refuses to tolerate
views different from his own, often reacting with uncontrolled rage, invective, and
abuse.”90 Other officers expressed even stronger criticism, doing their best to side
completely with the party hierarchy.
So clear was the party’s dominance of the military that even the officers who had
known Zhukov the longest — Marshal Semyon Budennyi, Marshal Ivan Konev,
and Marshal Sergei Biriuzov, among others — disavowed their past ties with him.91
After one of the speakers on the first day of the plenum referred to the “special
friendship between Cde. Konev and Marshal Zhukov,” Konev spoke with
Khrushchev and sent a note to the CPSU Presidium insisting that it would be a
“profound mistake to believe I was ever particularly close to Zhukov.” Konev’s
denials prompted Khrushchev to begin his own speech at the plenum by “correcting
the record” along the lines that Konev sought:
“We don’t have any basis for suggesting that Cde. Konev’s past relationship
with Cde. Zhukov should cast any sort of pall on Cde. Konev. Cde. Konev is a
member of the CPSU CC and a long-time member of the party, and he always
was a loyal member of the party and a worthy member of the CPSU CC. He
remains so now.”92
By highlighting Konev’s eagerness to renounce his previous ties with Zhukov,
Khrushchev underscored the consensus against the deposed minister and let the full
Central Committee see that, despite Zhukov’s misdeeds, high-ranking military
officers were no different from other “true Communists” in placing party loyalty
above personal relationships.
One final point worth mentioning about the October 1957 plenum is the valuable
light it sheds on the state of the Soviet armed forces in the mid- to late 1950s.
Intriguing information about this matter can be found not only in the proceedings,
but in the collection of documents associated with the plenum. These documents
consist mainly of various drafts of the plenum resolution and the “closed letter” that
was eventually distributed to all CPSU members about the Zhukov affair.93 The
letter itself adds nothing to the many charges outlined at the plenum, but one of the
other documents released to the Central Committee, a top-secret “Order of the
90. “Plenum TsK KPSS, oktiabr’ 1957 goda, XX Sozyv: Stenogramma pervogo zasedaniia
Plenuma TsK KPSS,” 28 October 1957 (Strictly Secret), TsKhSD, f. 2, op. 1, d. 266, ll. 123-
124.
91. See, for example, the speeches recorded in TsKhSD, f. 2, op. 1, d. 267, 268, and 269.
92. “Rech’ tov. N. S. Khrushcheva,” ll. 4-5.
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USSR Minister of Defense,” signed by Zhukov and the chief of the Soviet General
Staff, Marshal Vasilii Sokolovskii, on 12 May 1956, provides an interesting
assessment of “the state of military discipline in the Soviet Army and Navy” in the
mid-1950s.94 Zhukov and Sokolovskii highlighted problems in the Soviet armed
forces that seem remarkably similar to many of the ills afflicting today’s Russian
armed forces:
“Both the army and the navy are plagued by a huge number of crimes and
extraordinary incidents, of which the most serious dangers are posed by: cases
of insubordination to commanders and, what is particularly unacceptable in the
army, the voicing of insults to superiors; outrageous behavior by servicemen
vis-a-vis the local population; desertion and unexplained leaves of absence by
servicemen; and accidents and disasters with aviation transport, combat aircraft,
and ships.
The problem of drunkenness among servicemen, including officers, has taken
on vast dimensions in the army and navy. As a rule, the majority of
extraordinary incidents and crimes committed by servicemen are connected
with drunkenness.
The extremely unsatisfactory state of military discipline in many units and
formations of the army, and especially in the navy, prevents troops from being
maintained at a high level of combat readiness and undermines efforts to
strengthen the Armed Forces.”95
The standards used by Zhukov and Sokolovskii may have been a good deal higher
than those used today, and the pervasiveness of “unsavory phenomena” is
undoubtedly greater now than it was then. Some of these problems had been known
earlier from the testimony of emigres/defectors and occasional articles in the Soviet
press.96 Nevertheless, it is striking (and comforting) to see that dissatisfaction about
the state of military discipline was nearly as great in Moscow some 40-45 years ago
as it is today.
93. “Materialy k Protokolu No. 5 zasedaniia Plenuma TsK KPSS 28-29. 10. 1957 g.,” TsKhSD,
f. 2, op. 1, d. 261. The drafts of the closed letter, “Zakrytoe pis’mo Tsentral’nogo Komiteta
KPSS ko vsem partiinym organizatsiiam predpriiatii, kolkhozov, uchrezhdenii, partiinym
organizatsiiam Sovetskoi Armii i Flota, k chlenam i kandidatam v chleny Kommunisticheskoi
partii Sovetskogo Soiuza,” are found on ll. 99-122ob.
94. “Prikaz Ministra oborony SSSR No. 0090, 12 maia 1956 g., o sostoianii voinskoi
distsipliny v Sovetskoi Armii i Voenno-Morskom Flote i merakh po ee ukrepleniiu,” 12 May
1956 (Top Secret), signed by G. Zhukov and V. Sokolovskii, TsKhSD, f. 2, op. 1, d. 261, ll. 31-
35.
95. Ibid., l. 32.
96. Herbert Goldhamer, The Soviet soldier: Soviet military management at the troop level
(New York: Crane, Russak & Company, 1975): 141-169.
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Concluding observations
This overview of the structure, context, and content of declassified materials from
Central Committee plenums shows both the limitations and the potential value of
these documents. So long as scholars bear in mind that the Central Committee was
not a decision-making body and that the plenums were carefully managed by top
CPSU officials for their own purposes, the documents can yield a good deal of
useful information. Some of the materials provide fresh insights into key trends and
events, including domestic changes in the Soviet Union and important episodes
from the Cold War. Other documents are important mainly because of what they
reveal about the manipulation of the plenums by senior officials. One of the most
salient features of the plenums during the first five years after Stalin’s death was the
spillover from the leadership struggle. Even when the plenums were supposed to
focus on crucial domestic or foreign issues, the divisions among top leaders had a
far-reaching effect on the proceedings. By the late 1950s, after Khrushchev had
dislodged his major rivals and consolidated his position as CPSU First Secretary,
the plenums increasingly were devoted to the growing rift between the Soviet
Union and China. This theme continued even after Khrushchev was unexpectedly
removed in 1964.
The plenum materials cover only selected portions of Soviet history and Soviet
foreign policy. Many topics were barely considered at all by the Central
Committee. The plenum documents are no substitute for the vastly more important
and far more voluminous records of the supreme decision-making body in the
Soviet Union, the CPSU Presidium/Politbiuro. Those records, unfortunately, are
still largely sealed. Yet even if the Politbiuro archives are eventually made fully
accessible, the plenum materials will remain a valuable, indeed indispensable,
source. Although the plenum transcripts and supplementary documents must be
used with great caution, they provide a wealth of insights into the role of the Central
Committee in Soviet policy-making.
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